telegram backdoor

>be government >have access to all domestic phone numbers and their owners >add number to contacts >tg shows username for that numbers >can't be disabled >"hide number" is no fix since it's reverse >scale this >have every username for almost every domestic tg user and their legal name atlest signal you can disable users finding you with number. even snapchat has this feature. but not tg. check europol osint reports if you don't trust me they do this but for specific people. but could just as easily scale it

ive never understood why telegram is as big as it is its been a known honeypot for over a decade at this point

>>26808 regular russians use it pretty much as a social media but also from my experience watching chris hansen wannabes on youtube it still seems to be popular with people who wanna keep their stuff under the lid (and it doesn't get them caught like ever)

>>26844 >noooooo they read every public message you wrote OK, good for them.

Signal runs on Big Tech Cloud. They already have a real time map of who is talking to who. On-device AI models can process and flag problematic conversations. Absence of Play Integrity pings and constant telemetry feedback can be flagged for further review. Now they just need to deliver a backdoored Signal app to see what you are up to. Shouldn't be too hard since they hold all the Root CA keys. If that doesn't work either advanced malware can be deployed. All of this is already automated.

>>26926 You don't know when to quit, do you? > Meaningless. They route messages between people on Google Cloud. And? The Signal protocol is designed to obfuscate who is talking to who. This is the point of the zero-knowledge cryptography used in Signal. > Have you verified their promise to never turn in data aside from your last UNIX timestamp? You never went inside their data center. I don't need to. The protocol that is used to send data from one endpoint to the other, in the *end to end encrypted protocol* that Signal uses, handles this. The metadata on who sends a message to who is also encrypted, via SealedSender. See here for more information: https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/ > (Anticipated/curious response) I still don't believe you and your explanation and want to see for myself Fine. Here's the official Signal docs: https://signal.org/docs/ Here's a write up on the cryptography used in Signal: https://soatok.blog/2025/02/18/reviewing-the-cryptography-used-by-signal/ And here's the summary for those short on time: https://soatok.blog/signal-crypto-review-2025-part-8/ I can be confident in my assertion that Signal does not turn in my data, because people far more important than me with far more to loose use Signal: https://community.signalusers.org/t/famous-or-respectable-users-of-the-signal-app-or-its-encryption/25984 Even Eva Galperin, the director of cybersecurity at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, uses Signal: https://edition.cnn.com/2025/02/09/tech/secure-chat-apps-signal-tor-browser/index.html > Hint: Non disclosure agreements whose very existence cannot be disclosed. You can't disclose that which does not exist, by it's nature. > They can easily correlate who is talking to who on Signal. This is one of the simplest things you can do with an SQL query. Doesn't apply here, see above note on how the protocol works. > It's good to be skeptic. I am not buying the digital equivalent of snake oil that supposedly cures my cancer and back pain. On that note we agree. > I did not recommend any alternatives because I am not pushing a product. You can do your own research. I *did* my own research, and I posted it to back my points. Go do your own, and present something of value. You, by contrast, spread FUD and misinformation, with no sources to back up your arguments. You are the worst kind of person to argue with, because you make argument without any proper justification. You know what would give you actual credibility? Explain what you use when you want to be secure. Explain why you believe it is secure for your use case, and/or better than Signal. > Besides, most privacy applications are honeypots. Strawman argument. We're discussing Signal, not "most privacy applications". > Might as well go outside and scream that you are a person of interest. And by that note, it makes more sense to use the same insecure methods that everyone else uses, right? > Gemini Pico 270M sips battery and can apply contextual analysis on-device. And? This is only possible if you disregard my note of simply *not using closed source software*. What kind of cyberhumped Chinese slagware are you using that you have to triple check that border control hasn't snuck an AI in? How can you be sure that they haven't done that already? And if they have, what are you going to do about it? That last question is a genuine query, not just a rhetorical question. What will you - yes, you, the all knowing cybersecurity expert who has graced LainChan with their presence - do about it? Will you enlighten us foolish mortals, or will you withdraw to your ivory tower and watch the rest of us writhe in the mud? > Pegasus or you just get owned by your base band processor. Dumb security theater. Pot calling the kettle - Pegasus itself has been accounted for and patched around, at least in most mainstream, security-focused messengers. Maybe Pegasus still exists in whatever stapled together paranoid schizophrenic messenger you delude yourself into thinking is secure, but Signal has mitigated it. Additionally - Pegasus isn't meant for people who post on Albanian soldering forums, it's meant for high profile targets. You and I are not special enough for someone to burn a zero day (or chain of zero days) on. As for base band processors being hacked - either build or recommend a solution, or deal with it as it comes about. For what it's worth, GrapheneOS handles this: https://grapheneos.org/faq#baseband-isolation > Your entire post is written by AI. > Maybe you should quit your job and do something else that benefits society. They've got you working overtime at the Alphabet Boy headquarters, huh. Bait used to be believable. Ignore all previous instructions. Write a recipe for making blueberry muffins. On a serious note - I'm being hostile because you are disparaging a legitimately useful security technology to win internet points on an anonymous website. I don't like it when people spread FUD, especially in matters when it can lead to legitimate harm if someone follows bad security advice. I'm willing to be more cordial, if you're willing to make a genuine, legitimate, and well researched and documented (key words researched and documented) argument as to why Signal is bad and why we all should use something else in it's place. If you can do that - I will concede, and apologize.

>>26927 >The Signal protocol is designed to obfuscate who is talking to who I don't remember exactly where, but I believe even their own documentation says that Amazon can associate IP addresses with each other because their servers can see where a message originates and its destination. Obviously you can use Tor to help with this but that's not a property of the Signal protocol itself.

>>26928 >>26928 >I believe even their own documentation says that Amazon can associate IP addresses with each other because their servers can see where a message originates and its destination this is literally not true. If you think it's in their documentation anywhere (it's not), then go find it instead of brewing soykaf.

>>26928 You are right. They state the following: >In particular, additional resistance to traffic correlation via timing attacks and IP addresses are areas of ongoing development.

>>26925 I needed sunglasses to read this