How do I know if my USB WiFi Adapter or USB drive has DMA?

WiFi USB adapters typically do not support Direct Memory Access (DMA) in the same way that internal components like PCIe devices do. DMA is a feature that allows certain hardware subsystems to access the main system memory independently of the CPU, which can improve performance by offloading data transfer tasks. Most USB devices, including WiFi adapters, rely on the USB protocol for communication, which generally involves the CPU in data transfer processes. However, some advanced USB controllers and devices may implement features that allow for more efficient data handling, but this is not the same as traditional DMA. To determine if a USB flash drive supports Direct Memory Access (DMA), you typically won't find explicit labeling or specifications on the packaging. DMA support is more about the underlying hardware architecture and how the device interacts with the host system rather than a feature that is commonly advertised. However, here are some indicators and methods to assess DMA support: Note: DMA support is not typically advertised on consumer-level USB flash drives > 1. USB Controller: The USB controller in the host system (e.g., your computer) plays a significant role in DMA capabilities. Most modern USB controllers (especially those supporting USB 3.0 and above) are designed to handle DMA. If the USB flash drive is connected to a system with a USB 3.0 or higher controller, it is more likely to utilize DMA. > 2. Device Class: Some USB devices, particularly those designed for high-performance applications (like SSDs or high-speed data transfer devices), may be more likely to support DMA. Look for devices marketed for high-performance use. > 3. Technical Specifications: Check the technical specifications or datasheet provided by the manufacturer. While it may not explicitly mention DMA, details about the data transfer methods or performance metrics can provide clues. Look for mentions of "high-speed data transfer" or "efficient data handling." > 4. Manufacturer Support: If you have a specific model in mind, consider reaching out to the manufacturer directly. They may provide detailed information about the device's architecture and whether it supports DMA. In summary, while there are no clear indicators on consumer packaging that directly state DMA support, understanding the USB version, the type of controller, and researching the specific device can help you assess the likelihood of DMA capabilities.

So basically, there is no way, thank you. Also, everything these days uses DMA. Just another backdoor. No point fretting over it. Big tech has pwned you years ago already.

>>25115 >So basically, there is no way, thank you No, WiFi USB adapters are better then PCIe WiFI cards in you laptop if you need wireless cause they don't use DMA. This seems to be related to that copy pasta >Do NOT use a HDD or SSD. They have DMA so a malicious firmware could do a lot of damage, use of USB is preferred since they do not have DMA USB devices can also support DMA, particularly when using USB 3.0 and later versions. Therefore, the assertion that USB drives do not have DMA is misleading. In fact, USB devices can be vulnerable to similar attacks if they have malicious firmware. However I think USB live systems are a better choice for privacy and security. That said their may ways to make an external SSD be option but this needs to be looked into. >Firmware attack can drop persistent malware in hidden SSD area https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/firmware-attack-can-drop-persistent-malware-in-hidden-ssd-area/ >ability to infect and be transmitted through the hard drive firmware of several major hard drive manufacturers, and create and use hidden disk areas https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equation_Group#Firmware

>Buy a thinkpad x230 and install heads. Write protect the flash chip. Put nail polish on the screws and take high resolution pictures to ensure signs of tampering. Do NOT use a HDD or SSD. They have DMA so a malicious firmware could do a lot of damage, use of USB is preferred since they do not have DMA. Completely remove the microphone, sound card, webcam and the WWAN card from the laptop. Remove the fan to prevent binary acoustic data transmission. Replace the default wifi card with a supported atheros card. Disable wifi when not in use, preferably by physically removing the card. Make your own independent Linux distro from scratch. Most Linux distros value convenience over security and will thus never have good security. Your only option is to make your own. Use musl instead of glibc, Libressl instead of openssl, sinit instead of systemd, oksh instead of bash, toybox instead of gnu coreutils to reduce attack surface. Enable as little kernel modules as possible. Use a hardened memory allocator. Apply strong SELinux and sandboxing policies. Restrict the root account heavily to make sure it never gets compromised. Disable JavaScript and CSS in your browser. Block all FAGMAN domains in your hosts file. Monitor all network requests. Do not use a phone. Never speak near anyone who owns a phone, they are always listening. Never use any non-corebooted technology made after 2006. Never leave your devices unattended. Tape triple layer aluminum foil all around your room as tempest shielding. Type really quietly as defense against audio keylogging. Use ecc ram to minimize rowhammer and rambleed. Encrypt everything multiple times with various different encryption implementations. Compile everything from source. Use hardened compilation flags. Always read through the source before installing something if possible. Only use the internet when absolutely necessary.

>>25115 >No g o y don't try to secure your stuff just give up. And definitely do look into Red black engineering or TEMPEST. Just totally ignore the electromagnetic spectrum. In fact ONLY focus on software. Download windows. And take a pentesting course. Get into building your own virus scanner. And start chasing the IoCs on your network!!!! But definitely whatever you do DON'T EVER EVER LOOK INTO PHYSICS OF IT ALL. >>25117 Found the IDF. Anyways lain OP good research so far.

>>25119 It's hard to take you seriously when you go full scrizo mode and advice me to use 15 years old thinkpad without a fuarrrking hard drive.

>>25121 I think he was trying his hand at sarcasm but is maybe an ESL? He was perhaps sarcastically saying only focus on software, but do not look into Red Grey Black Engineering and TEMPEST emission mitigation. There's big money plus an intelligence value having people chase software ghosts rather than looking at what their hardware is doing at the byte, assembly and electron levels. If you notice the closed-source space whenever they come out with a new update or new OS there's billions of dollars in the economy trying to fix it. It never gets fixed. Intelligence Community obviously knows this. They wouldn't want people to start looking at chips or investigating what may be leaking down their power lines or captured on their home cable modem's built-in diagnostic spectrum analyzer.

>>25123 And now just remember that big tech has basically pwned everything through and through. Enthusiasts do not have enough resources to even try and figure out what really happens behind the scenes. And even if they did, how do you bring down big tech? There's simply no way to do it. And besides, IIRC it's not lawful to revers engineer hardware, so we can't even have a company try to revers engineer some devices to prove they have malware. At least these are my current delusions, or something along those lines. The core idea is, they trapped us in inability to either prove them malicious or, with or without the said knowledge, do anything about them.

Doesn't libreboot or coreboot offer option to disable DMA in the firmware?

>>25117 That is the copypasta about DMA >>25119 Yeah people should not only look into software but the hardware to secure a device. That said that's why I remove any webcam modules by unplugging the ribbon cable from the motherboard since webcams modules have a microphone but some models will have two microphones (1 built into the webcam module and another microphone module) sometimes you sill see two pin size holes in the display my the camera indicate two modules. Either way you just have to remove both if you have both. >>25121 >It's hard to take you seriously when you go full scrizo mode sod off back to reddit and also take your meds DESCOVY for PrEP®

>>25124 There are hidden cores in modern CPUs that are abstracted away from OS developers. Other than the proprietary Intel ME and AMD PSP on-chip encrypted firmware. https://www.devever.net/~hl/backstage-cast >Mainly we have the substantial assistance of assorted reverse engineers and security researchers to thank for the fact that we even have a decent picture of what the modern x86 boot process actually looks like for both Intel and AMD. >Basically any multiprocessor CPU chip of reasonable sophistication produced today — i.e., desktop and server CPUs, and probably smartphone SoCs for that matter, also has an entire “backstage cast” of ancillary support cores keeping things running correctly. >Some of these mainly handle the boot process, and we're more likely to know about these (e.g. Intel ME/AMD PSP), but even less known are “backstage” cores which don't participate in the boot process but which are instead involved in things like power and thermal regulation. >Intel and AMD x86 platforms confer a distinct sense of “pay no attention to the man behind the curtain” in their design, essentially trying to conceal the existence of these ancillary cores. >AMD CPUs, for example, not only have the PSP, but also have an ancillary core known as the System Management Unit (SMU). >Before Zen it used the LM32 ISA, now it uses the Xtensa ISA. >Some references seem to suggest that modern AMD CPUs actually have multiple SMUs, with different responsibilities, but it's hard to confirm this. >The conclusion here is that I don't even actually know how many of these SMUs a modern AMD CPU has. >Moreover, we just happen to have managed to find out about AMD's SMU; does Intel have an equivalent, more effectively hidden? Probably, though I don't know. >This means that the total number of cores on an IBM POWER9 chip is: [...] summing to 22 ancillary backstage cores, or 46 cores in total. Thus, almost half of the cores on the CPU module are actually part of the backstage cast! Now there's no indication of nefarious cores yet, but if people keep preferring spyware products, one fine day there will be network capable wrongthink detectors on-chip that not even the kernel can see, these could analyze memory, network signals, video in-out, sound in-out 24/7. For our security of course. Hell, we're halfway there, with people uploading their unencrypted location, photos, documents to random companies.

>>25132 >one fine day there will be network capable wrongthink detectors on-chip that not even the kernel can see That's exactly what the new NPU AI chips are for since they can't seem to implement Chat Control in EU without backdoors that client side scan messages before encryption.

I think its the opposite said for privacy in this article about NPU https://medium.com/@craigadebanji46/how-npus-protect-your-privacy-b1993d1e847d >NPUs can encrypt your data before sending it to the cloud or other devices, as they can perform encryption and decryption faster and more securely than CPUs. >NPUs can process your data on your device, rather than sending it to the cloud, as they can run neural networks locally and offline.

>>25133 >>25134 NPUs are supposed to be yet another specialized instruction set, like SSE or AVX. That's how it would be in a non clown world, or more likely it wouldn't exist at all because it's a waste of silicon space. I'd say new instructions is all it'll be. Chip makers forced by AI hype and Windows requirements to put these weak-ass units into their products. If there was an AI model, a "consciousness" embedded into hardware, that'd need gigabytes of memory, it's not realistic to sneak that much in at the moment, but I'm sure the time will come. Spy crap for now will remain the responsibility of the phone and desktop OS that everyone uses, with the hardware merely powering the exploitation of user data. Realistic next step in the near future would be companies continuing to lock down operating systems more, making sure you run the spyware and aren't in control of your own device. Like Windows 11 has done with TPM, Secure Boot and mandatory online accounts, like how users are fully locked out of Apple devices and most Android ones already, like Google banning sideloaded apps right now.

If software for pipephones was good enough it would solve 90% of issues. Run linux, fund open source, use pipephone. Buy a huge sound proof box and store your android phone there. Only use when necessary for some tardard crap like messangers. Profit

>>25136 >Run linux, fund open source, use pipephone. What about bongphone? I want a phone that can remove the PGR (Plant Growth Regulator) and Miracle-Gro from my opensource kush?

>>25142 You and me too anon, also how do I upvote your post?

>>25117 > TL;DR all is botnet Yes, yes it is lainon.