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If Tor is backdoored by the feds, why hasn't anyone developed an alternative?(USER WAS WARNED FOR THIS POST, You should always elaborate on your opinions rather than just spilling the soykaf.)

>>23946 Man, this post is like kicking dead whales down the beach. It's not backdoored by feds, no one has been able to prove it. It's just FUD being spread, likely by feds. Frankly, it's not in their best interest to backdoor anything related to tor, because they use it to protect their agents in the field. The more people who use it = the safer the feds are.

>>23946 Because the feds are paying off major companies and launching sitng operations on any programmer suspected to harbor intent of furthering privacy and also they are watching you at all times. Or maybe it's all made up and they just run honeypots instead. If you are genuinely interested there are already multiple threads essentially dedicated to schizoposting about glowie Tor backdoors. Cheers.

>>23947 >If Tor is backdoored >If keyword >>23948 >If you are genuinely interested there are already multiple threads essentially dedicated to schizoposting about glowie Tor backdoors. Many threads about the problem, but no one is discussing solutions. >launching sting operations on any programmer suspected What's stopping someone from developing it in secret and sharing anonymously?

>>23949 There are no tangible solutions. The solution is something you figure out for yourself. You can't connect to Tor from your own home, and you probably shouldn't even use any networks near your home, or region, in which case you'd have to travel. This is not realistic for someone who wants to regularly use the internet. The solution is to dissolve the NSA, prevent them from being allowed to conduct mass surveillance. You can never be anonymous 100% of the time you use the internet with Tor, only some of the time, unless the government is prevented from perpetrating mass surveillance, or mixnets grow, but even still, as long as the government is allowed to perpetrate mass surveillance they'll be able to undermine mixnets which will hinder their effectiveness.

>>23946 >why hasn't anyone developed an alternative? maybe because it's fuarrrking awful that every network gets filled with retards (read: pedos, junkies, psyops, religious/political extremists, edgelords, human trade, etc) and everyone else has to take the blame for them like they would ever do it for you fuarrrk them as much as the policy makers

anything oxen-based

>>23950 >You can't connect to Tor from your own home Unless your local network blocks Tor, or your government considers any Tor use an offense, says who? The government could hypothetically correlate packets by size and date, but that's not so easy AFAIK

>>23974 for a government like the united states that has access to virtually all isps in america and europe where the majority of tor nodes are hosted, i'd say that they can successfully correlate traffic semi-regularly, definitely not all the time but probably a few times a day for someone that uses tor 24/7

>>23947 This desu I've seen absolutely no evidence that tor is "backdoored" and even some evidence that it is not. There are leaked CIA documents about tor implying they struggle to deanonymize tor users. There have been a few cases where feds have been able to deanonymize users, but only after months of carefully tracking multiple tor nodes and investigation, if anything this only reinforces tors effectiveness and you've bought into the psyop. Fedjacketting is one of the worst tricks feds have up their sleeves.

freenet is, in a sense, an alternative to .onion sites

i2p is an alternative, but the setup is a little more complex and it can fastly become poorly secured. Be safe lainons.

the actual problem is that it, by default, typically, almost assuredly, and "for anonymity purposes" moves your 'encrypted data' outside of the borders of the united states -- which is a freebie for 'them', because they allowed themselves to capture any encrypted packets that leave the US jursidiction under the rule of muh terrorism

>>23974 >The government could hypothetically correlate packets by size and date Tor pads packets to be the same size. Correlating by time is possible but hard because you need to be listening on both ends of the Tor tunnel and there is an unpredictable amount of traffic and latency between the 3 hops. >>24107 >freenet is, in a sense, an alternative to .onion sites Freenet is broken by design. It relies on everyone forwarding pieces of files for everyone else. It is supposed to give you plausible deniability since your neighbor does not know if you are requesting a file fragment for yourself or passing it on to another node. In reality attackers can plant multiple nodes near you and run statistical models to guess what they will find on your harddrive when they raid you. >>24202 i2p is good although the java project has some culture war issues with non-english speaking project members getting purged because woke idiots think that anybody who has touched a bible is a nazi or whatever. There is a c++ alternative called i2pd though.

>>24218 Isn't i2p also vulnerable to those kind of attacks ?

>>23946 The US Navy made Tor. Backdoor possible? Yes. Actually backdoored? Maybe. Community audits aren't enough: collective action issue, high source complexity, possible blobs, possible Reflections on Trusting Trust (compiler backdoor) issues with binary distribution. Your options: blindly trust, audit and build yourself, or diversify. Like I2P over Tor. If possible, on separate hardware or VMs. Whonix has a guide. Always read whitepapers, documentation, and attack papers. They help you weigh the options.

I get so sick of all this dumb-ass fud about Tor. The guy who actually wrote it (Roger Dingledine), and is still in charge of it, is freely avaiable to answer questions about it over on irc.oftc net in one of the Tor channels. His nick is arma. But I'll save you thr trouble... he will tell you that Tor never has been, and never will be, backdoored. Whether you trust his word or not is your business. I do, and I'm not exactly known for trusting a lot of people.

People have, check out Dissent. It's a protocol based around verifiable dining cryptographers networks and verifiable shuffle with both asymmetric and symmetric encryption options. Now defunct, however, because it never really caught on. Very cool, albeit a bit esoteric if you're not super into crypto.

>>24419 Tor might not be backdoored, but the infrastructure is relies on (DNS, and also HTTPS with its monopolized CA authorities) is definitely vulnerable to the feds. >logjam >SNI >MITM via Cloudflare and DNS server patching >less than 8k Tor relays >less than 3k bridges >timing analysis of packets to sniff out client traffic in tandem with shutting off parts of the internet. Makes it very simple to find someone

>>24486 Then why is that everyone you hear about fuarrrking up on Tor, like DNM server owners, gets some long-form video about how they were caught lacking on the OPSEC front. If it were really that easy, tracking people down that way wouldn't be necessary. The trails people leave are easier to compile and act on than "timing analysis of packets to sniff". That's just an insane statement & vector to believe is being actively utilized in practice.

>>24645 Not who you're responding to, but different entities have different goals and characteristics. Negating Tor categorically is entirely different than targeting a specific user. In the specific user's case, an adversary might want to identify all of that user's isolated streams. Very different approach. And different adversaries won't all have the same resources. LE would have to find legal methods, primary or parallel constructive, which may make a pure dragnet useless in court. And LE won't ever have the same budget or priorities as their corresponding military, who could easily employ a dragnet approach. Journalists and individuals probably don't have the resources to implement anything like a dragnet, and would be forced to scan for bad OPSEC. Though to be fair, all of the above are probably looking for bad OPSEC. Another argument would be that more capable organizations are either dragging nets for collection, profiling, eventual parallel construction, or future use. So you would probably never hear about it even if they did use it against you. Finally, OPSEC transcends media. I'm glad they highlight it because it spreads awareness about OPSEC. There are also many possible reasons a journalist might have for highlighting it in their stories. Criminals bad, criminals weak, criminals human, whatever.

>>23947 >Tor not backdoored >Chipset and OS backdoored Does it matter? All is botnet. >>23946 >If Tor is backdoored by the feds, why hasn't anyone developed an alternative? >If lel So why hasn't anyone destroyed their life with party vans camped outside their home and/or SWATting when the operating system they develop it on, ***and*** the chipset running it, is already backdoored? Browser is botnet. Web is botnet. OS is botnet. Chipset is botnet. All is botnet. Solution: OTP & number station - it's what they use. Nanobot surveillance complicates things, since your aura reports(/doxes you) back on the wire 802.15.6 (you're an electrical being & your neurons electrical impulses can be read basically). We gone full /cyberpunk/ nao lainon.

>>24656 what the fuarrrk are you even talking about

>>24656 Baited 1(one) lainanon award

>>24658 >what the fuarrrk are you even talking about It should have been obvious. If not I'm sorry. I thought this was the same lainchan I posted on years ago where some of the best tech minds in the world posted anonymously. Clearly that is no longer true. The error is mine for assuming things would still be as they once were. As a less advanced post, I'd offer that the Tor Project source code can be cross checked against CVE databases using AI with heuristics to determine a probability of state-actor zero-days likely in play. This would be a fruitful exercise to the one who performs it. Further discretization by commits and writeprints would probably yield a party van visit for learning too much. >>24660 If only it was bait lainanon, if only it was...

>>24645 Sad to see such naivety displayed on lainchan, but putting my irrelevant feelings aside....you appear to conflate a fish being observed in a pond, with the fish being pulled from the pond. Each is separate and distinct. Furthermore, "that's just an insane statement & vector to believe in" is the best reason to use it. The best attacks are ones the other parties would never consider as possible. Nation state zero-day almanacs would testify to this, if you read them.

>>24656 >All is botnet We are already there. In populated places, one is monitored by all the machines there. In the most remote places, one can still monitored, with satellites or those 5G-towers. At this point I can only hope that the AI-overlord is a benevolent one. >>24684 >Further discretization by commits and writeprints would probably yield a party van visit for learning too much. That's the long and short of it. The whole system has already been rolled out, and everyone in this matrix is being observed. This is currently happening and through these observations, 'behavioural change' can be furthered (using those same machines most people have become so dependant one). When you find this out, and talk too much, that's most usually the time when you're getting tailed and threatened. p.s. not the same on you were replying to, but this topic is of great interest to me.

>>23946 Its less "backdoor" than strong arming ISPs for netflow data. Correlating connections becomes a classic graphing problem. Might be good to read up on the history around this subject. There was a reason Nakamoto published his paper anonymously. https://www.vice.com/en/article/tor-projects-moves-away-from-team-cymru-infrastructure/ https://www.vice.com/en/article/data-brokers-netflow-data-team-cymru/ https://www.twipla.com/en/blog/how-the-augury-platform-captures-email-and-internet-data https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vEFpAlSaCv4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_Wars https://www.cnet.com/news/privacy/security-researcher-i-keep-getting-detained-by-feds/ https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14560106 https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/the_nsa_is_brea.html

>>24692 meant to add: and flooding the network with exit nodes they control. Any volunteer network to this degree becomes a trust issue. Even with strong crypto there will be the possibility of side channel attacks and information that can be inferred if enough connection data can be collected. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Attacks_against_TLS/SSL

>>24693 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PRISM https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A

>>24694 these are just the things that we know about. that would be what you're up against in developing an alternative. even freenet, i2p, etc. you think there's not some giant data farm that could be queried to correlate timestamps and netflow data with cell phone locations and god knows what else lol. nah anonymity is dead outside low tech, hobo in a hat with a pawn shop cash payed laptop on mcdonalds wifi. thats just the world we're in now unless youre operating from south america. even if you are, pissing off the wrong people will land you in a hellish prison or a hired cartel hit. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_government_mass_surveillance_projects https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2020/09/inside-palantir-technologies-peter-thiel-alex-karp.html https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01972243.2022.2100851#d1e286 https://www.theverge.com/2024/8/8/24216215/palantir-microsoft-azure-ai-defense-partnership-surveillance https://www.liberationnews.org/privatized-mass-surveillance-babel-streets-new-product-is-watching-your-networks-synthesizing-your-connections/

>>24695 i'm not saying this to soykaf all over the notion of privacy or anonymity. i just want the skids to be aware, before spending a ton of effort launching some ransomware campaign and counting up that sweet monero, there are a miriad of ways your opsec can fuarrrk you in the ass while attempting to cash out for that cherry lambo. the people running the most profitable companies in this world are absolute psychos and are not above spending the coin hunting you down. A lot of the successful APT groups out there are far from anonymous, but are operating from and backed by nation-states and criminal groups. https://attack.mitre.org/groups/

https://www.platformer.news/telegram-durov-arrest-france-explainer/

People develop alternatives all the time, and the feds crack them / infiltrate them / envelop and takeover them. It's a constant adversarial relationship. People will always try to have freedom and privacy and the feds will always try to sneak in and spy on it or control it. All platforms and systems will cyberhump on a long enough timeline

>>24419 >Nooooo you have to trust Roger Dingledine!! B-because... You just have to, okay?!! H-he has a forum handle and even answers questions!! >In 2006, Tor research was funded was through a no-bid federal contract awarded to Dingledine’s consulting company, Moria Labs. And starting in 2007, the Pentagon cash came directly through the Tor Project itself — thanks to the fact that Team Tor finally left EFF and registered its own independent 501(c)(3) non-profit. >In 2007, it appears that all of Tor’s funding came from the federal government via two grants. A quarter million came from the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), a CIA spinoff that now operates under the Broadcasting Board of Governors. >The second chunk of cash — just under $100,000 — came from Internews, an NGO aimed at funding and training dissident and activists abroad. Tor’s subsequent tax filings show that grants from Internews were in fact conduits for “pass through” grants from the US State Department. >In 2008, Tor got $527,000 again from IBB and Internews, which meant that 90% of its funding came U.S. government sources that year. >In 2009, the federal government provided just over $900,000, or about 90% of the funding. Part of that cash came through a $632,189 federal grant from the State Department, described in tax filings as a “Pass-Through from Internews Network International.” Another $270,000 came via the CIA-spinoff IBB. The Swedish government gave $38,000, while Google gave a minuscule $29,000. TOR is cyberhumped. IDGAF about any of your complaints or calling it "fud." If you don't understand that TOR is cyberhumped then you are like a little baby, a total rube. Fud is one thing, but when somebody is telling you not to eat rat poison or step in a beartrap and you respond with "aw that's just fud" then you are simply retarded

>>24702 https://blog.torproject.org/transparency-openness-and-our-2021-and-2022-financials/ Nothing you've said is new. You don't understand why Tor was created, nor its weaknesses.

>>24702 and most of Mozilla's funding came from google. this doesn't mean what you think it does, and if i was a state actor i would use this exact FUD in a disinfo campaign.

i get the complain about tor funding or being used by feds, but imo the real issue with it is that it sticks out like a sore thumb when you use it and it feels like asking your internet traffic to be monitored. when the town you live in experiences a cyber crime and you are the only tor user, or one of the few, you will definitely be a prime suspect whatever you did. there were news about a guy getting arrested for a bomb threat in a uni campus because he was the only one using tor. i still use it to access blocked websites but if i was in law enforcement i would get suspicious by a single guy that uses tor in let's say 5-10 thousand people if i knew my soykaf. thoughts?

>>24714 This has been discussed before elsewhere. OpSec from a (former) Darknet Vendor: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01oeaBb85Xc When Cybercriminals with Good OpSec Attack: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zXmZnU2GdVk Phineas Fisher's HackBack: https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/phineas-fisher-hackback-a-diy-guide-i Edward Snowden and Kevin Metnick both used other people's connections when doing things that they didn't want scrutinized. Snowden used wardriving (driving around a neighborhood scanning for networks with weak security), Metnick used a long-range antenna to use someone else's network. The long and short of it is to ensure that you have some way of accessing Tor (or your VPN, or your anonymizer) from a connection unrelated to you. Build a long-range wifi antenna, connect to a public wifi node a few miles away from you, and use their connection. > when the town you live in experiences a cyber crime and you are the only tor user, or one of the few, you will definitely be a prime suspect whatever you did. If you're doing illegal things, take precautions accordingly. > there were news about a guy getting arrested for a bomb threat in a uni campus because he was the only one using tor. See above note on using someone else's connection.

>>24716 thank you for the detailed answers, however i was talking more about a "normal" tor usage that does not entail crimes like it is ideally supposed to be used. Let's say a normal guy wants to use tor 24/7 because he does not want to be on a ISP log and on a server log for whatever he does. He just does not want to be tracked by anyone. My question is, won't that user be ultimately correlated to real criminals that use tor just because he uses it? At that point, he will be monitored 24/7 by LE just because tor is used. So does using tor for every connection, clearnet and not, even make sense or is it truly only useful just to "do crimes" and access onion services in 2024? Is my reasoning right here?

>>24717 i've only used tor for years and havent been surveilled afaik, and i live in a country that could be deemed a bit authoritarian. i knew another guy who only used tor for over a decade, also never surveilled.

>>24716 >connect to a public wifi node a few miles away You should adjust your expectations. In reality you will be lucky to get a viable connection from the parking lot right outside.

>>24719 > You should adjust your expectations. In reality you will be lucky to get a viable connection from the parking lot right outside. Note the mention of a long-range wifi antenna. There are commercial ones that are more specialized for this (In the Darknet Vendor video linked, the presenter notes that he used a Yagi antenna and had line-of-sight to the network he used), but you can build one using a Pringles can and a generic Wifi adapter. This video goes more into depth on the DIY route: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KJh_nkgwTjw >>24717 Take all of this with quite a bit of skepticism. This falls more into the realm of game theory than technology, which is not my strong suit. That being said: > Let's say a normal guy wants to use tor 24/7 because he does not want to be on a ISP log and on a server log for whatever he does. He just does not want to be tracked by anyone. My question is, won't that user be ultimately correlated to real criminals that use tor just because he uses it? Probably, but that's an unfortunate fact of life. Criminals use cars and public transport, they communicate on cell phones and post on social media, they use VPNs and anonymisers, same as the rest of the general population. Law enforcement must decide if they want to allocate more or less effort towards monitoring certain people in certain areas doing certain things. If using Tor in a certain area in a certain time frame happens to fall into a higher priority for law enforcement, then normal people will likely be caught up in an investigation somehow because they just so happen to keep the same odd hours and write in a similar style as a Bolivian cyber crime group. > At that point, he will be monitored 24/7 by LE just because Tor is used. So does using tor for every connection, clearnet and not, even make sense or is it truly only useful just to "do crimes" and access onion services in 2024? Is my reasoning right here? Logging onto Tor only when one is going to to "do crimes" (buying drugs, pirating content, writing code in memory-unsafe languages, etc.) creates a pattern: John Doe logs onto Tor for a few hours, something illegal happens within that time frame, John logs off of Tor. John is the only Tor user on the network at the time, so he is suspected of the illegal activities. This is how the university student you mention in >>24714 got arrested. If everyone uses Tor to commit crimes, LE will simply monitor Tor and guess who is committing a crime based on who is using Tor at some time and place. If everyone uses Tor for other, more mundane things (updating GPG keys, downloading and uploading updates for software, posting to LainChan and other imageboards, etc.), LE must now decide if they want to monitor the entire network for every instance of Tor usage, or if they are better off focusing on specific instances where Tor usage corresponds with illegal activities. They likely do both, but they will (probably) focus more on the latter approach. The long and short of it is, you can probably use Tor for without fear of surveillance, so long as you don't only use it for crime and your illegal activities don't attract the attention of law enforcement too often. That said, this is just my opinion, and I'm open to other's thoughts.

>>24721 >Logging onto Tor only when one is going to to "do crimes" (buying drugs, pirating content, writing code in memory-unsafe languages, etc.) creates a pattern: John Doe logs onto Tor for a few hours, something illegal happens within that time frame, John logs off of Tor. John is the only Tor user on the network at the time, so he is suspected of the illegal activities. This is how the university student you mention in >>24714 got arrested. That's a good argument, but wouldn't he have been caught even if he used tor 24/7, since he was the only tor user in the campus anyway? >The long and short of it is, you can probably use Tor for without fear of surveillance, so long as you don't only use it for crime and your illegal activities don't attract the attention of law enforcement too often. That said, this is just my opinion, and I'm open to other's thoughts. the thing is, law enforcement cannot know, so they are probably going to monitor you and keep logs no matter what aren't they? I mean again, if you were in cyber police or something and you see a single dude using tor every hour every day in a town of 50k people what would you do realistically? That's basically wiretap material (not counting personal morals of course)

>>24725 If you live in a town of 50k, what is the chance you are actually the only person who uses tor? Tor seems to indicate that 350k users connect directly from the USA (and not many from bridges) https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=2024-06-07&end=2024-09-05&country=us&events=off 350k tor users in USA / 345M people in USA = 1/1000 tor users per capita. There should be like 50 in a town of 50k. Probably a lot of skittish people viewing [generic porn website], or wizards are real and I don't have an invite to the right hidden services. A simple search seems to indicate that 33% of people use a VPN to "mask their internet activity" (higher numbers for all-purpose VPN use) It seems possible that 1 out of ~330 people about to rent a VPN searched something like "better and cheaper alternative to VPN" and found tor and didn't stop using it when they ran into sites that blocked exit nodes, which would also yield a 1/1000 figure.

>>24721 >Note the mention of a long-range wifi antenna Don't get scammed by expensive "long-range" antennas. The limiting factor is the transmit power of the AP you are trying to connect to. You only control one side of that equation, you might be able to pump enough power through your antenna to sling a wifi packet over 2 miles but the other side doesn't have enough power to send anything back. When you see clickbait articles and videos about 2 mile wifi connections they are not connecting to starbucks they are connecting to their own AP with high power amplifiers to boost the signal on both ends. Instead of scrolling youtube and pontificating on forums if you actually get in your car and do this soykaf for real you will quickly find out what I told you which is that public wifi APs want to save energy so they are tuned to cover the inside of the building and nothing else. >>24725 >if you were in cyber police or something and you see a single dude using tor every hour every day in a town of 50k people what would you do realistically? It's more about connecting the dots like this >you arrive home >tor traffic starts spewing out of your home connection >a person of interest logs into a darknet forum or irc chat >you go to bed >the tor traffic stops coming out of your house >the person of interest logs out of the darknet forum This is how they gathered evidence against Jeremy Hammond. https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/03/stakeout-how-the-fbi-tracked-and-busted-a-chicago-anon/2/ Being cautious about establishing patterns like this is good advice.

>>24731 >This is how they gathered evidence against Jeremy Hammond. Maybe it's part of how they got one guy one time, but traffic correlation is almost never the way anons are caught. And it's not high tech Tor exploits, either. It's almost always moronic opsec blunders. Would you use radar and a heat seeking missile to kill a mouse when you can just find its poop and put a mousetrap there? Neither would LE/IC.

do u guys know about the cyberpunk webring? #cyberpunkbridgeswon

>>24734 >it doesn't matter if you have evidence because I have a different opinion I pulled out of my ass Thanks for your valuable contribution.

>>24734 >>24739 If anything we could assume that the fruits of burnable exploits are sometimes misrepresented as OPSEC blunders to keep them from leaking in court documents. Parallel construction or pure fabrication. Take the Silk Road case, there is some debate as to whether the prosecution claims about a script leaking server details were true.

>>24739 In science, or any other reputable area, the fact that one thing happened one way one time is called :anecdotal evidence". It doesn't carry much weight. But, hey, run with it if that's how you "reason".

>>24740 "there is some debate" is not the same as credible evidence one way or another. There are plenty of credible ways in which the IP address could have been leaked, it's pretty clear they didn't want to show how they actually got it but that doesn't automatically mean a 0day exploit. I think one shouldn't expect feds to be all that competent about not showing their hands. Spooks, sure, but feds are generally cops and they tend to brag about their cool gadgets. >>24741 "so this jury is to believe that just because my client killed one person one time, they are a murderer? That is totally anecdotal!"

>>24741 >In science, or any other reputable area, Tell us what super-duper reputable scientific reasoning you used to arrive at >>24734. >the fact that one thing happened one way one time is called :anecdotal evidence". It doesn't carry much weight Not quite. Anecdotal evidence is evidence based only on personal observation, collected in a casual or non-systematic manner. The ars article is based court records, i.e. evidence presented to a jury who found the defendant guilty beyond all reasonable doubt. It's certainly better than you making up your own fanfics about mice and heat seeking missiles. But >>24740 is also correct. When law enforcement use a capability they don't want people to know about, like a zero day exploit or a valuable human asset, they will fabricate a second chain of evidence for the actual prosecution so court records can't be taken as 100% fact.

>>24743 with these hackers you never see them actually challenging the official narrative behind their arrest, nor do you see them trying to get secret documents published. i've been reviewing a ton of arrest documents recently, over a hundred different cases so far. what i will say is that if you actually bother to take the time to review a case extensively, you will likely find traces of parallel construction, claims made by the authorities that don't make sense, elements of the police's story that seem too convenient e.g random mysterious man approaches terror suspect, further radicalizes him and gets him to say incriminating things, then vanishes and the police conveniently cannot track him down, but use his conversations with the suspect as evidence. one thing you will also see sometimes is the suspect try to reveal classified documents and be rejected, even scolded by the court for "obstructing the case".

>>24744 >i've been reviewing a ton of arrest documents recently Good, then it won't be a problem for you to show us one example.

>>24747 Ahmed Omar Abu Ali Sami Osmakac

>>24750 link?

>>23946 even if it is "backdoored" the fact remains that arrests are extremely rare and only happen to people who make glaring mistakes and draw attention to themselves. millions of dollars are traded on DNM's but hardly anyone gets arrested. if the feds do have the means, then they simply must not care.

I2p is a really great alternative and I think it has potential. I'm probably biased so take all my opinions about i2p with a grain of salt. Tor is a centralized network with about 8k nodes I think? Whilst i2p is all decentralized and anyone whom wants to use the network has to contribute to the bandwidth On tor torrenting is like the darkest of sins, It slows down the network On i2p torrenting helps to build out new tunnels, you find more peers and overall just speeds up the network. There are many things good about i2p, and lately I have noticed a significant increase in speed. I run all my routers at unlimited speed so I route as fast as I can and as much I can. But even tho I2p has all these seeming upsides iand is also 20yo, there could be hundreds of zero-days lurking in i2pd or the java client (don't use that one). Recently mental outlaw put out a post on how to torrent on i2p and on a tracker i saw a huge increase of peers. I'm really happy that he brings the community together but just like tor had, i2p will have it's momenta where you could get doxxed just by connecting to the network

www.politico.eu/article/police-ghost-encryption-app-drug-lords-mafia-europol

www.ghacks.net/2024/09/19/tor-anonymity-infiltrated-law-enforcement-monitors-servers-successfully

there's been plenty of experimental alternatives Flood detected; Post discarded. This is not a flood. Lame Let me post. I hate modern imageboard requirements. At least this doesn't require js.

>>24786 >Dumbass use old version of Ricochet from 7 years ago >Have access to a soykaf-ton of other similar apps to communicate but is too lazy >Doesn't realize the out-of-date soykaf is vulnerable to timing analysis attacks because it was released before vanguards roll out >Also only rely on Tor to stay safe while doing big criminal activity (CSAM) >Get pwnd >surprisedpikachu.jpg Big nothingburger and FUD; just a slightly higher hanging fruit than usual low hanging fruit.

>>24767 >centralized >8k nodes read that again jokes aside, I understand what you're saying (control of key parts of the Tor infrastructure, such as Directory Authorities, are controlled by a central(-ish) authority), but caution you to not fall into the "more decentralized = more anonymous" fallacy. The tor project's network health actively monitors the network to enforce relay requirements and has been able to prevent bad actors from flooding the network with malicious relays by rejecting them from directory authorities. i2p is not able to do this and has recognized this shortcoming for a long time (see https://geti2p.net/en/docs/how/network-database#sybil). There's a trade off here since if the directory authorities were compromised, tor would be, too, but as of now, rejecting/removing nodes from directory authorities involve consensus from the community, network health team, the directory authority operators, and relay operators, so it's unlikely there's been any significant compromise. >On tor torrenting is like the darkest of sins, It slows down the network This is sort of a misconception. 15 years ago, torrenting was considered bad form for slowing the network down, but the network is now healthy enough to handle it.The primary reason not to torrent over Tor is that many torrent applications will ignore the proxy setting because Tor uses TCP and torrenting is UDP, and some torrent applications send your IP address to peers anyway. that's not relevant for i2p because i2p torrent software is written with i2p in mind and traffic stays inside the i2p network >>24786 This is terrible journalism. There's no source for the timing analysis claims and after looking into the Vanir Locker claim, it seems like all German authorities did was take over one server they used in their ransomware infrastructure and no arrests have been made. No details have been made public on how it was seized, but given it was one server and no arrests were made, they probably just found an exploit on that server. It sounds like the author just asked chat-gpt "how hack tor?" and relied on the out put. Source for the vanir ransomware info: https://therecord.media/germany-seizes-vanir-ransomware-leak The other case involves a several years old, retired application which a known vulnerability.

>>24795 >There's no source for the timing analysis claims... Well of course there isn't. What do you expect from just another typical Tor FUD thread? Whether it's LE/IC spreading disinformation again, or some real nutcase who actually believes it, only morons take threads like this seriously.

>>23978 care to share some of these docs, lainon?

First and foremost you are only as anonymouse not cause you use Tor but how you use Tor just like using a computer. To be fair though I'm sure there is exploits that they don't disclose are being used till after case has been over (see the latest guard node discovery operation). People should be trying other options like I2P. Here are two examples of things that may or may not affect you regarding Tor browser (TBB) or applications that use torsocks (torified). If Tor browser or an application can read these two files you are screwed. So you need to make sure your AppArmor, Firejail or NSA SELinux is blocking access. file:///sys/class/net/ file:///sys/devices/virtual/dmi/id/ First is the files that actually list your real Mac Address of your interface devices. So if your spoofing it (you should be) and Tor browser or some application can read it then you can figure out the rest. Second is where your device info is like you motherboard make, model, serial number etc. So if Tor browser or an application can read these well again you can figure out the rest.

>>23946 tor is vulnerable to timing and side channel attacks .. It acts as a tunnel with multiple encryption layers, it is good as a start, but there should be a scheme of random routing, application level encryption, packet variable latency and noise insertion .. I can even think radically of channel & protocol level negotiation that makes it even hard to understand what people are sending something like communicating your protocol format in encrypted format and keep changing the channel .. the only way to subvert surveillance is to run a physical network that is hard to track and subvert ...

>>24810 I can bet anytime the tor browser has a fair amount of 0 days that are undisclosed ... Running that high number of C++ & JS is just doomed to be like that ...

>>24819 And no one will use their precious 0day with the possibility to burn it just to catch you. Maybe they do exist, and as you said it makes sense that 0day should exist, but they are gonna get used on whales; Market admins, adversary intelligence agents, etc. Not some random guy buying a few Ks of drug or brewing soykaf on lainchan.

>>24820 the 0days are just wholes in the code or limitations to protocals or like not proper sandboxing like above with reading hardware identifiers. Again though people shouldn't rely on on tool but rather utilize multiple tools (e.g I2P and Tor and neighbors WiFi)

>>24707 Every call from firefox to mozilla ( which is every functionality ) goes to a google controlled server. Simply check every domain in about:networking starting the browser.

>>24731 >Don't get scammed by expensive "long-range" antennas. The limiting factor is the transmit power of the AP you are trying to connect to. If your TX is equal to the TX of the AP "long range" a.k.a. parabolic or bandforming antennae work just fine for their stated purpose; SWIM used to slurp a local mall's internet with a 3-antenna router in a waterproof plastic bag tie-ripped to a balcony.

>>24218 The project was renamed, rearchitected, and rewritten in Rust. Are you talking about old Freenet or the new Hyphanet? https://www.hyphanet.org/

>>24877 Sorry I meant the old freenet (now Hyphanet) or the new Freenet (rewritten and architected 2023)

>>23946 The feds don't even need to backdoor Tor anymore. Encryption literally doesn't matter nowdays, because everything is alerady being scanned pre-encryption. Your own OS is literally taking screenshots of what you're doing and sending them to a central server somewhere, so whatever you are using encrypted channels for your communication doesn't matter at all. And if you think this only happens on Windows, but not on Linux, think again. Red Hat has been cought implementing this kind of stuff into their own distro just recently, and I'm pretty sure other distro developers are not far behind. If they refused, the feds would not let them continue.

>>25798 I see they're letting you use the computer room on the psych ward again. Are the feds still beaming thought-control rays at you?

>>25798 There are BUGS in MY fuarrrkING SKIN and they'll only LET ME live if I ROUTE EVERYTHING THROUGH THE TOR ROUTER

On the other hand, it's not too far away from truth. systemd, pipewire, gnome, the dbus infrastructure, all these things are obscenely complex and designed in an extremely over engineered manner. This is by *definition* malware. Software must be cleanly designed and have a set scope, otherwise it's malware. They *can* and *will* plant open source backdoors into your system. And no you will never know. If they get discovered, uh oh another zero day rce shkatanai

>>25803 I wouldn't know. I don't use distros with systemd. When there's a solution that simple, it kind of makes all the overblown paranoia and fud seem sort of stupid.

>>25800 TEMPEST MIL-STD-461G FOR PRE-ENCRYPTION HAX MIL-STD-464D HERO TO PROTECT YOUR MPADS TEMPEST MIL-STD-461G FOR PRE-ENCRYPTION HAX MIL-STD-464D HERO TO PROTECT YOUR MPADS TEMPEST MIL-STD-461G FOR PRE-ENCRYPTION HAX MIL-STD-464D HERO TO PROTECT YOUR MPADS TEMPEST MIL-STD-461G FOR PRE-ENCRYPTION HAX MIL-STD-464D HERO TO PROTECT YOUR MPADS TEMPEST MIL-STD-461G FOR PRE-ENCRYPTION HAX MIL-STD-464D HERO TO PROTECT YOUR MPADS TEMPEST MIL-STD-461G FOR PRE-ENCRYPTION HAX MIL-STD-464D HERO TO PROTECT YOUR MPADS. fuarrrk the CIA. fuarrrk Israel. Slava Ukraini!

>>23947 Isn't it at least proven that tor users are super vulnerable to things like timing attacks? IMO the entire concept of live web browsing/applications is bad privacywise. Ideally soykaf should be like sending letters in the mail.

>>25807 How the fuarrrk is it simple, when if you can't dedicate 5 hours a days to fuarrrking around with debug suite in hands, you are restricted to at least eudev? And they are actively breaking ABIs and eudev lacks contributors, so it's going to die off soon if nobody picks it up, so vast majority of users will be restricted to systemd-udev. Even fuarrrking browsers require it. And then, elogind. There *is* hope seatd devs will do something about it, I am not very knowledgeable about this particular thing. The dependency on systemd and its parts is going to grow, so your little safe space hasn't many years left at this point. And if you don't have expertise to contribute (like me) you can only watch it all unfold with fingers crossed.

>>23946 There are many smaller networks like I2P or Yggdraisel.

>>25803 sysd got already caught twice at least (might be more than im unaware of) timing attacks on tor have been also confirmed, i do think it would be trivial to stop them though- just add random delay to nodes. It would get slower but whatever. >25798 this post is btw for real even if it looks crazy for those unaware. photo viewer is now fingerprinting images you open on 10 which means they track how images travel. And "microsoft recall" is supposed to record everything you do on next windows.

>>25825 >this post is btw for real Nonetheless, >>25798 is a big overstatement. I also highly doubt that this happens on every distro available, if it happens at all.

>>25826 my comment was merely regarding windows. I think it should be spread more how extensive windows surveillance got recently, its on a level avg people find it hard to believe which is a statement in itself.

>>25814 >Isn't it at least proven that tor users are super vulnerable to things like timing attacks? No, it isn't. Snowden leaks showed that even state-level actors with all their massive resources find attempted correlation attacks not worth the effort. >>25816 How the fuarrrk is it simple, when if you can't dedicate 5 hours a days to fuarrrking around with debug suite in hands, you are restricted to at least eudev? What the fuarrrk are you talking about? Anybody who uses Debian can just install Devuan or MX Linux or other distros they can use without systemd, and keep computing the same way they always did without any of your imaginary bullshit trouble. You;ve never even tried one, have you? And MX Linux is now the most popular distro according to DistroWatch. People get so sick of all this ignorant FUD from dimwits who don't know their ass from a hole in the ground.

>>25828 snowden is old news, timing attacks being doable was something reported just last year.

>>25829 Show me your evidence that timing attacks are a practical means of attacking Tor. Oh... that's right... You can't because there isn't any. Anything else you want to pull out of your ass and wave around? Even better. You set up a honeypot any way you want. I'll browse to it and you do a timing attack on me and post my IP address. You even already have one end of the circuit under your watch. Fact is, you can't. And you're so full of soykaf it stinks in here.

>>23946 this is pretty ridiculous. 1) Because it's not - or if it is, its a conclusion that has to be properly reached first rather than just being assumed based on shoddy theories, if even that. tor isnt perfect, and it has flaws and limitations just like all computer and software stuff ever. if you have enough money and time, you can probably break it, and the government has lots of money and other peoples time. operation onymous is worth looking at as an example. its not because the government put some secret backdoor in the code, its because they figured out that running a ton of servers themselves can grant them more insight into the traffic to potentially deanonymize services or users, something that tor isnt able to feasibly protect against since it relies on volunteers, but cant truly ensure that they are acting in good faith. but even then, it was very resource intensive and limited in scope, targeting primarily darknet markets and the like. 2) as for alternatives, freenet is old and not that usable. i2p is a bit more popular, but its still less accessible. its difficult to develop alternatives, and it just doesnt tend to work out because everyone keeps trying to make their own thing that doesnt work with anything else instead of improving existing systems, and all of them end up sucking due to lack of contribution due to all the possible contributors instead making their own. xkcd 927 and all overall, tor is flawed and its weaknesses are further compounded by how centralized the internet is as a whole and how its kept that way to benefit the rich. you cant fix structural and societal problems with code.

>>25831 its a topic because cops claimed they did last year. Did it really happen? Who know but logically its sound. normal user cant do it cause they aint your ISP / law enforcement. The idea requires observing every entry/exit node and linking input/output by traffic pattern. The attack is you introduce a delay pattern in the packets on exit node and that pattern propagates to your entry node. So as long as they watch the entry/exit nodes they know who it was by simple pattern matching.

No ISP or law enforcement agency, or even state intelligence agency, has the capability to watch every packet of every user of every guard node in the world simultaneously. Guard nodes aren't listed like exit nodes. Even if they had a complete list of them, they don't have technological capability of doing it. In the case of state-run intelligence agencies with massive resources, they don't know every gaurd node in the world, either. And even though they might be able to simultaneously watch every packet of every user on a large number of guard nodes they can monitor, it's still a statistical game of hoping their target is using one of them. And the resources necessary to do that are so huge that it's a waste of their time unless they're desperate. Also, why would an entity with the capability to do that bother running nodes? They can monitor all the traffic entering and leaving the nodes they know about if the traffic is passing through the major backbone access points they monitor, without running a single node. But again, no one agency has complete access to all the internet traffic in the world. So it boils doen to "if they can monitor that part of the internet, and if the guard node happens to be in that part of the internet, and if the target happens to be using a guard node in that part of the internet, and if the target is important enough to allocate all of those resources, then there's a chance that maybe they might be able to identify the target's ip address." And anyone who believes any police department's fud about being able to do that is an idiot. Their job is to lie and spread fud so dumber kinds of people will hesitate to use Tor.

>>25834 AI is making this easier. I constantly warn people the implications AI has on mass surveillance but they dont listen.

>>25834 >Guard nodes aren't listed like exit nodes. This is untrue. Tor relays, including those you may use as a guard node, are public knowledge. Are you perhaps confusing guard nodes with (optional) bridge nodes? Every other thing you said, I agree with you.

>>23946 Intel AX201 cards are backdoored. They ship binary blobs in linux and they have alogrithms to detect your location automatically .. What else can they do ?

>>25836 I stand corrected. Thank you.

>>25835 are you meredith whittaker lol

>>25840 Not surprising given how drezzed modern hardware is

>>25840 >They ship binary blobs in linux and they have alogrithms to detect your location automatically It's probably just listening to the wifi signals around it to determine which frequencies are being used. They do this because different countries have different laws about which frequencies are legal/illegal to transmit on. That's what they mean by "location" and country code and regulatory configuration. It's not magically pin pointing your gps coordinates on google maps or whatever schizo conclusions you're leaping to.

>>25870 they use advanced wave analysis techniques to intercept instructions executed by your brain to read your memory and extract your current location.

>>25870 I assume an idiot like you doesn't know about CSI ..

Build your own encrypted proxy chain

>>25890 I assume an idiot like you doesn't know about SYDG ..

>>23946 >If Tor is backdoored by the feds, >If Broseph doesn't know. For those of you in Rio Linda, I'm gonna explain some things about TOR that you might not have known. TOR isn't just "backdoored." TOR was created by the NSA. "Dissidents" (read: CIA spies) in places like Iran and China needed a way to communicate with their handlers that wouldn't get them instantly pwn3d and a 2am visit from a Faraja or MSS black-bag team. Any other use is incidental, and, in fact, discouraged. https://lowendbox.com/blog/man-found-guilty-of-child-porn-because-he-ran-a-tor-exit-node-the-story-of-william-weber/ The tl;dr is, muh freedumbs of speech, muh information wants to be free, that ain't for you, peasant. It's for "dissidents" in Russia to talk to their handlers at Langley. Depending on the particular "democratic" Western nation in which you live, you can and will get a trip to prison for setting up a TOR exit node that the prosecutor says was used to send CP. Those guys at the EFF who said you should do this to help dissidents in Russia won't be testifying at the trial. Mens rea? Criminal intent? Due process? What a compelling argument. Now assume the position. I assume that everything is backdoored. I assume that everything I say on the Internet, regardless of whether I'm trying to be a dollar store version of James Bond with a cantenna and a disposable pawn shop laptop--purchased with cash--with Tails OS and an anti-tampering thermite charge duct taped to the HDD, is being monitored, at the very least by AI systems set up to flag "interesting" material (see also, Total Information Awareness, warrantless wiretaps, Project CARNIVORE, Project ECHELON, and all the stuff Wikileaks revealed almost twenty years ago). I assume I'm on all the watchlists. I strive to be as boring as possible on the Internet, and in my day to day life. That may not be very "cyberpunk," but Broseph, I hate to be the one to tell you, it ain't 1972, and you ain't Captain Crunch.

>>25940 don't make me tap the sign

>>25941 why would Protonmail give the feds a headache? Didn't they give away the IP of some activist because they subpoenad Proton? Tor, now that I get. But Protonmail complies with the Swiss government so I'm confused.

>>25940 >I'm gonna explain some things about TOR Writng "TOR" instead or "Tor" is a dead giveaway that you don't know much about Tor. >TOR was created by the NSA. Onion routing was developed at the United States Naval Research Laboratory. Tor was developed by Roger Dingledine and others. You can talk to Roger on OFTC IRC network in one of the Tor channels. His nick is "arma". He's always happy to correct nonsense like yours. The one thing you got right is that Tor was originally intended to help US intelligence services communicate securely and anonymously. It's also used frequently by journalist, human rights activists, people avoiding surveillance by oppressive governments, and ordinary people who value their anonymity and don't like to be tracked by Big Business or anyone else. Some of the organizations that fund the Tor Project are: - EFF (See Surveillance Self-Defense at https://ssd.eff.org for good tips) - Internews - Human Rights Watch >muh information wants to be free, that ain't for you, peasant. Tor is for anyone who wants to use it, at any time, at no charge.

>>25953 >Tor is for anyone who wants to use it, at any time, at no charge. It's just a (temporary) consequence, but not a goal.

>>25952 >FUD, lmao. the word itself is meme. No, FUD is just an ordinary abbreviation you cab find in the dictionary: FUD [ ef-yoo-dee, fuhd ] abbreviation for fear, uncertainty, and doubt: Her article should help reduce FUD and increase understanding about the upcoming policy changes. Traders are concerned about the effect of the current FUD factor on stock markets. FUDs about the new technology are keeping people from buying into it. https://www.dictionary.com/browse/fud Are you on drugs or something?

>>25951 >why would protonmail give feds a headache there's other mail providers that give more, such as access to all emails. remember the feds goal is not simply put users on security software with some issues, most security software has some issues. but to create total fear and uncertainty about all security software and its usage.

>>25953 >Writng "TOR" instead or "Tor" is a dead giveaway that you don't know much about Tor. I write it TOR because I know it melts the brains of people like you to see it written that way

>>25957 I think they are playing a pretty good game of cat and mouse, with the feds being both sides. if someone "promotes" protonmail, you will always have someone go against it with unrefutable proof (proton giving away info to the swiss gov. , for example). and then you have "people" just muddying the water by spewing paranoid stuff (not refuting it btw, a JS backdoor can be possible but is unlikely to happen to you) and causing paranoia. and then there's the actual privacy minded people calling eachother feds, and not wanting to listen to what the other side wants to say. I may just be overthinking it though.

>>25958 >i used the incorrect terminology and a kind soul stopped to help me out what a fool he is lolol le epic trollz What a pathetic existence.

>>25835 Its not like they didn't have these before it was mass. They've been using fancy algos for years.

>>25984 >it's The Onion Router >but don't call it TOR, pl0x >it makes my brain twitch! Seriously?

>>26036 The people who wrote and maintain Tor state explicity that, "It's' Tor', not 'TOR'." Anyone familiar with the Tor Project knows that.

>>26037 They are not correct. They have been infected by woke propaganda and refuse to acknowledge the decades old tradition of acronyms. The correct spelling is TOR. Modern days programmers don't even know basic grammar.

>>26038 >project states how their name should be properly spelled >noooo!!! they are wokies!!! what

why does no one (except stallman) get this worked up about for instance gnu+linux or a lot of other things. No one quibbles much about whether you need a 'the' in front of FBI or CIA, yet the OR people seem to get weirdly worked up about how to write their abbreviation. I dont get it.

>>26041 its called a shibboleth, some IRL communities have them. for instance what your underground rail system is called in different places. in some areas if you're not from the community people will think about you differently. in the case of lainchan, posters like >>26038 are saying that if you can't bother to read the blog posts tor project already has addressing the FUD and speak boomerishly about them then you are an unserious moron who shouldn't listened to.

>>26036 >it's The Onion Router >but don't call it TOR, pl0x >it makes my brain twitch! Call it whatever you want. The point is if you've read the source code, or docs, or any research papers or the mailing list or engaged with the community in any way then you would know it's Tor not TOR. By typing it wrong you just told everyone in the thread that you have no idea what you're talking about. All your information is either made up or sourced from people who also have no idea what they're talking about. It was an act of kindness to point this out to you but by all means ignore us and carry on putting your pants on backwards. You're not trolling anyone you're just making an ass out of yourself. https://support.torproject.org/about/why-is-it-called-tor/ >Note: even though it originally came from an acronym, Tor is not spelled "TOR". Only the first letter is capitalized. In fact, we can usually spot people who haven't read any of our website (and have instead learned everything they know about Tor from news articles) by the fact that they spell it wrong.

>>26045 >even though it originally came from an acronym, Tor is not spelled "TOR". That isn't how acronyms work, but thanks for playing. Also, >the TOR project >The The Onion Router Project kek

It is Tor, it is 'The onion router'. It doesn't use "Onion Routing" it uses 'onion routing'. You don't speak of 'Anonymizers' or 'Mixnets with 'Onion Routing' technology. You use anonymizers or mixnets with onion routing or garlic routing. Your opinion on how acronyms should be spelled is irrelevant. The fact of the matter is that if you read studies about Tor and read its documentation you would know how it is spelled. You don't do this so you don't know how it is spelled. End of story.

>>26042 You're right but you come to the wrong conclusion. Irreverence is a key part of hacker culture, and Tor is significantly a project embodying irreverence. You can't track me! Your firewalls can't stop me! By declaring a correct way of writing the name of the project they are baiting clueless rule following dullards to enforce the totally arbitrary, stupid rule that makes no sense, and thus reveal themselves in a relatively harmless fashion. It is therefore a shibboleth of sorts, but a hacker's twist on the shibboleth.

>>26048 What about Narus tho fr fr I heard they have Narus STA 6400 on all entry nodes nocap

>>25870 Wow are you sure? I do know about how different frequency is set based ob country codes.

>>26049 >le wavey arm meme man coolface.jpeg I know you're baiting but there's something called suspension of disbelief when you're trolling someone that shows some trolls are smarter than others, for instance if you're baiting someone into specifically asking a question the answer is a joke like "shark skin is smooth as fuarrrk" there should be a way in which its evident you're trolling to people who aren't your victim, otherwise you're just "merely pretending" to be retarded. tactlessly posting FUD while calling the tor project TOR is sort of like soykafting in the sandbox as "proof" that you're smarter than the other kids, it lowers the quality of discussion and does not in fact make you smarter. im aware that sometimes, violently illiterate retards find this soykaf funny but there's other communities for them. anyways, that post you're responding to quoted the wrong person and the concept being quoted - the shibboleth - does not historically mean what the particular sect of internet use it for. but I'm glad you could find something that makes sense to you, i hope it also makes sense to you why this thread isn't designated for soykaf.

>>23978 >leaked how do you know that was unintentional?

Tor is a backdoor or more specifically C2

>>23946 its not backdoored, but without a fuarrrkload of people using it, it wont be as effective. The news and influencers treat Tor as some darkweb soykaf, people who don't know any better fall for it, it becomes less effective without more packets being sent. >>23952 unrelated, but i hate how every attempt at making a free speech platform devolves into retardation>>23946

>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XDsLDhKG8Cs Apparently BGP can be used to unmask Tor users? It's probably very unlikely, though?

Unlikely?! In Russia TSPU of RKN controls everything and can override everything.

>>26452 > In Russia TSPU of RKN I'm afraid, in Russia TSPU "стреляет себе в член" (shoots itself in a dick) in that sense. Because Tor is completely blocked, new nodes operatively blacklisting, so most people are using Bridges. Usually, you first connect to Microsoft Azure or use other bridge and only then connect to nodes. If you are in Russia. Or tor network won't work at all. So, BGP-attack to deanonymize someone in person in Russia is completely senseless. If I understand video correct. Yes, they control and override everything but in context of BGP-routing they fail. As no one will connect to malicious nodes (The main point is in that, right? Redirect first connection to government controlled malicious node), everyone in Russia firstly connect in Bridge. The only way to get proof (honestly, has an investigation or police ever needed evidence in Russia???) that someone in Russia is connected to Tor in a certain moment is to make that BGP-attack against the whole Internet (incl. Microsoft Azure). Other way, they have no clue If I am wrong, please correct me

>thread about Tor >random fed tries to bait everyone with le ebin "It's TOR not Tor lulz" I see this behavior on any *chan where a Tor discussing is occuring, sus.

That guy looks uncannily like one of the characters from Mr Robot

>>23946 you people realize that if poleeece already know who you are then tor will not do soykaf to hide your internet activity yes? they will just contact your ISP and get the internet traffic from them - before & after TOR

>>26793 that requires them to do a lot of work and spend a lot of effort, it raises the overall cost of doing these sorts of operations to the police. Almost anything can be defeated with enough effort, but generally speaking that much effort isn't going to be spent except on the most important targets

>techniques already in use >confirmation attack >traffic analysis >guard discovery https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Warning#Tor_Network_Attacks >low cost side channel attacks via website oracles (picrel) >other theoretically possible attacks https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Speculative_Tor_Attacks >automation >ai >functionally unlimited resources why would they need a back door lmao

Thinking about using a custom proxy before TOR, a Raspberry PI installed long long away from my location that forwards my requests to TOR.