SELinux and the NSA

Is it true that SELinux has lots of zero-day exploits created by the NSA and Red Hat? SELinux has almost 900K lines of code, plenty of room to subtly hide some exploits and security holes. At this point we know that Red Hat and the feds are/were in cahoots (see: the anti-Iranian Trojan distro, Parsidora) but whether or not SELinux itself is compromised is an open question. I'd like to hear Lain's thoughts on this issue

>>21271 If we knew the 0day existed, it wouldn't be a 0day for very long.

>>21271 I know systemd and RedHat is garbage and backdoor for feds. But otherwise I see projects where the first thing they do is disable SELinux in /etc/selinux/config because most infosecnormal people are scared as hell when the hole soykaf throw errors as mad because they are too stupid to write custom selinux profiles for their soykafty programmed app. Its actually a good idea to have extended right managment. Devs sets chmod -R 777 all the time the only know rwx. With selinux you can defined that your soykaf app can only access limited resources (context). It contains access right to a area when the hole app gets exploited.

>>21271 >SELinux has almost 900K lines of code, plenty of room to subtly hide some exploits and security holes And what are the chances that none of them have been found after 20 years of heavy use? And if they wanted to backdoor Linux wouldn't they anonymously contribute to a common part of the kernel that everyone uses? Not have john@nsa.gov commit all the backdoors in the big NSA module that is trivial to disable. sage for dumb thread