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Important: You are the only person who can mount your outer volume with the hidden volume protection enabled (since nobody else knows your hidden volume password). When an adversary asks you to mount an outer volume, you of course must not mount it with the hidden volume protection enabled. You must mount it as a normal volume (and then VeraCrypt will not show the volume type "Outer" but "Normal"). <strong>The reason is that, during the time when an outer volume is mounted with the hidden volume protection enabled, the adversary can find out that a hidden volume exists within the outer volume (he/she will be able to find it out until the volume is dismounted and possibly even some time after the computer has been powered off - see Unencrypted Data in RAM).</strong> So, technically if I mount outer volume with the protection and someone finds that the partition is mounted with it, it may be used as a proof of having a hidden partition. Is it worth it to create a hidden partition inside a hidden partition, the way I could use outer partition without revealing the existence of the second hidden partition? If someone forces me to give them access to the hidden partition, they would see only the hidden partition I want to show to them.

>>19040 >if I mount outer volume with the protection and someone finds that the partition is mounted with it, it may be used as a proof of having a hidden partition. Having software capable of creating hidden partitions is proof you have a hidden partition.

>>19041 This is not the primary goal of this software, you cannot prove that I used it for this purpose

>>19042 >you cannot prove X Prove to who?

>>19041 see bullshit like this is exactly why I go full skitzo, nothing you do is proof of jack soykaf if everything you do is unhinged and insane for example, why do I have six bottles of jizz in my room?

>>19048 You just need a threat model. Who are you defending against and what are their capabilities. The problem with you and >>19042 is that you're projecting yourself as both and attacker and the defender and then nothing makes sense.

>>19049 my threat model is any other human since they all try to hurt me all the time without fail, so I hide my identity online in case someone were to find my social media and try to harm me there my computer's hard drives are all fully encrypted the passwords are 64 characters long and I move every six months to throw off anyone who might be spying on me, I have VPNs that I use for different reasons, some I made myself others I buy, I don't buy from mainstream VPNs because they're too well known, in the event of a crackdown NORD will be the first to go and I doubt they're nearly as safe as people think, of course I only use my purchased VPN for anything untowards as an external factor to throw people off, I actually start up a virtual machine while my purchased vpn is active and then log into my personal server with openvpn and use that to actually hide my information while I pirate cowboy bebop for the 20th time

>>19050 >my threat model is everyone That's the same as having no threat model at all. And nothing you said relates to hidden volumes either.

You have drive with total size X. You create two partitions, "hidden" Y and "open" Z. Total size Y+Z=X. Upon pressure you reveal contents of partition Z. There is still something garbage-looking on your drive X-Z=Y, what is that thing an adversary asks, isn't that a hidden VeraCrypt partition since this is a default function of VeraCrypt and there is no real reason to leave garbage looking data on your drive? *torture sounds* Check section 5.2 of cryptsetup FAQ, they explain why hidden volumes are placebo against any real world forensic adversary: https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/wikis/FrequentlyAskedQuestions#5-security-aspects

>>19054 I don't have time to figure out what word in my post is triggering the "go away spammer" message. Fμck, how is this chan still alive.

>>19051 big brained thinking, i see