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Are dumbphones the most secure form of mobile device of communication one can have? If not why is so? From my understanding dumbphones should be vastly superior to smartphones when it comes to security, since there are far less avenues your information can be unfairly appropriated. With dumbphones you get the advantage of having a removable battery and as well all know without electricity no signals can be sent. Hence you can remove the battery while walking around town and only when you need to call/message someone, put it back in so you have the power necessary to make such connection. Dumbphones, from my understanding, seem to allow you the comfort of being able to communicate easily while simultaneously not losing out when it comes to your security, i.e. being tracked. What am I missing? Any experts when it comes to mobile security/opsec care to weigh in?

Are there any open hardware/firmware dumbphones? If not, which model and brand would you trust the most?

People will tell you smartphones are superior because SMS and the phone network are cyberhumped, whereas with a smartphone you can at least use secure voip and encrypted messaging. But in reality smartphones are cyberhumped exactly for the same reason, just with a lot more companies in on the tracking orgy. No one calls their friend using a secure self-hosted voip solution. It's true that dumbphone users can have their location triangulated by virtue of being connected to the cellular network, but the same is true of smartphones, only that dumbphones don't have GPS capability that is constantly being abused by virtually every app. If you want to reach people and be reached, a dumbphone is a sane choice in this insane world. Not having a phone at all is obviously superior, but very few actually follow through. Also, be careful with your terminology, security and privacy are not interchangeable. Smartphones are often more secure, it just so happens that some designs include the private companies offering the service to snoop. Apple is a great example of this, they actually for the most part do have secure products.

>>17138 >If you want to reach people and be reached, a dumbphone is a sane choice in this insane world. Not having a phone at all is obviously superior, but very few actually follow through. Based & featurephonepilled, you put it better than I could.

>>17136 All dumb phones run OS's that are radially hacked and tracked. The SMS on them is unencrypted and unprotected from man in the middle attacks. The phone itself is a red flag to alphabet boys because they're linked to burner phones that criminals use They're easier for cell companies to track You cant flash custom Roms on them Bottom line, you only think your safer because they have less features. In reality, they offer less protection from the very people you are trying to avoid. Get a pixel and graphene or CalyxOS

>>17140 But they have removable batteries, that you can unplug anytime. As long as you never send sensitive info over SMS (as you shouldn't) the fact that they run on older tech is not really problematic

>>17142 That also depends on whether or not they have a separate battery than the one you can remove. Some phones have those for backup reasons but can also be used to track you with the battery out. Quick way to test that is by removing the battery and placing it back in a minute or so later without a sim. If the phone does not display the proper time, you're good. Still, even then, those phones are easier to track than a smartphone. Smartphones are also trackable, but at least you can block more with them. It does boil down to how you manage your interactions and your own personal opsec, but its actually more difficult to be more secure on a feature phone than a smart one. https://youtu.be/ dWDLivOv_VA There's a good video on the topic.

>>17143 If you're committed to using a dumbphone then I don't know why you aren't opening it up to inspect it and disabling the microphones, camera, etc. Also, please stop linking to that idiot. He's one step above someone with a Guy fuarrrks mask.

>>17142 it's certainly easier to find a feature phone with a removable battery than a smartphone with a removable battery, but these days it's neither common in feature phones nor impossible to find in smart phones, so it's not a clear cut advantage. but even if the only way to have a removable battery was to use a feature phone, you'd have to weigh that against all the disadvantages of using a phone that's basically impossible to secure or significantly modify without just crippling its functionality. the only situation i can see this making sense is if your phone is off with the battery out at all times unless you need to make a call. basically, you just keep it in tucked away it in case of emergency. if that describes how you plan to use your phone, then sure the feature phone might be a good choice. if, on the other hand, you plan on using your phone somewhat conventionally, then i really don't see any advantage in the feature phone. >>17144 >disabling the microphones what do you plan to do with a feature phone that can't call people because you ripped out the mic? just send people cleartext sms on your t9 keyboard? why not just use one of those mobile data hotspot things at that point? (honestly, i think those are going to be the new meme. it just makes sense if you're prioritizing privacy above all else to keep only the very basics on the device you can't control and just interface with it from a device you can control).

>>17145 >what do you plan to do with a feature phone that can't call people because you ripped out the mic? Remember that time Snowden showed everyone how to disassemble a phone and remove the microphones so the NSA couldn't listen to you? I guess not. >it just makes sense if you're prioritizing privacy above all else to keep only the very basics on the device you can't control and just interface with it from a device you can control People do this with big boy computers using serial cables and data diodes. I'm sure there's a relatively idiot proof way to do this with phones over a wired connection but I don't know what it would be.

>>17143 Lol, rtcs have been a thing for decades now, they obviously don't need as much energy as radio transmission so this is not a valid test

>>17140 >no roms ever heard of GerdaOS for Nokia 8110 4G aka Banana Phone?

>>17146 >dumbphone >mic input pick one, smartphone kiddo

>>17151 Nokia started selling phones that supported hands free headsets via TRRS 15-20 years ago, around the time color screens became popular. Before that they supported external mics through a proprietary port. In my experience, TRRS mic input has been widely if not ubiquitously supported for 15 years. If you tried it with an older dumbphone and it didn't work, it may be because you were trying to use a CTIA plug on an OMTP socket. Kiddo.

>>17136 Crappy computer with removable battery with hard-coded software < Crappy computer with removable battery and freedom to choose software. You can't use encrypted messaging system routed over tor on your "dumbphone", young man. If you can't do that, not only your location is known to main adversary (government), but also metadata (destinations, social graph) with contents of your messages and phone calls. Ain't their business what I call my mother for. I don't care whether some foreign Chinese or American corporation spies on me since they have no legal power over me, if you do, install Lineage OS. Sage for soykafe thread we get every single friggin month since 2018.

>>17153 You seem to miss the point that such phones were closer to single-use applicances, so there's no point in browsing over Tor with them. Secondly, nothing prevents you from tethering a non-cellphone wireless computer to it and using Tor on that one so long as the first device supports thetering..

>>17155 continued But then my opinion on the matter is that dumbphones aren't a good answer either. Direct mobile network connection should be limited to portable modem devices that have ethernet and wireless tethering for another safer device you carry, and no other feature on those modems. Then you main device, whatever it is (probably a pocket computer) can do useful work safely.

In the sense that using a dumbphone will probably result in doing less communication using your mobile device, yes. >>17138 >Smartphones are often more secure not Android ones. I mainly use a dumbphone because I am uninterested in having the features that smartphones have. The only thing I could conceivably use a smartphone for is Signal, and I spent a while without any phone at all using Signal on my PC and I definitely don't need it on my phone. Cell phones are for sending quick, unimportant messages when you can't get to your computer.

>>17156 You can remove a modem from a phone and use external one, like a 2005 pocket computer. As a cell phone it's still better than mystery meat "dumbphone" because you control the software.

>>17136 >Are dumbphones the most secure form of mobile device of communication one can have I don't know if this has been answered already, but I'll give you a definitive answer... N O O O O Here's why: >supply chain still compromised >no way to defend from IMSEI/IMEI catchers >useless without SIM >All calls and messages still logged at backbone level (carrier) >Obsolete protocols, going obsolete, insecurity, etc Stop sh1lling dumbphones, they are not a solution...>>17136

>>17167 They are not useless without a SIM card in fact they can be very helpful. Every phone can make phone calls to emergency services even without a SIM card. SIM cards are just so the carrier can track your payments.

>>17136 Today I went to unlock my phone because it was locked to the carrier that I had bought it from (meaning it could only take SIM cards from them and not other carriers) and when I arrived at the store they said "This number is not identified, do you want to identify it?" I said "no" of course. But then following the unlocking of the IMEI, they said they needed my first and last name, to which I replied "Is it necessary?" and they said "Yes". I gave them a fake name and they didn't bother me anymore, but still I'm fuming with their nerve of asking me to attach my identity to this phone number, fuarrrking pieces of flaming sh!t

>>17169 Welcome to the 21st century, anon. We're being tracked everywhere.

>>17136 >dumbphones Those from before 2010 or the newer ones with data connection and preloaded apps? There's a huge difference even though in th eend it boils down to this >>17167

>>17280 And Alice should also keep in mind that Bob's setup is important too.

>>17136 read the entire thread and I have my 2cents in the topic. I personally use Nokia 110 over a "smartphone" and here are the 2 mains reasons (I do own a smartphone at home with CalyxOS that I use to send messages over telegram when on the pooper) 1. the simple phone cured me of my mobile addiction. I no longer have the need to sit and scroll or just stare. I stare at the air or the walls like a good neanderthal. 2. I helps me limit all discussion and activity to my PC since I wont be tempted to use it for anything else "less secure" like >>17163 said pretty much. When people ask me about my phone and I start rambling about "freedom" and "tracking" they look weird at me so I just tell them that phones are sinful and this helps me keep my purity and everyone just agrees and moves on with their life.

Related to this topic, does an open source dumbphone OS exist? How would one get into making apps for dumbphones? There's no reason we couldn't have an XMPP client or simple cryptocurrency wallets on dumbphones.

>>17294 KaiOS, Android and Mudita OS are all more or less open source. I don't know about XMPP but older Nokia Symbian devices can run IRC.

loooooool is this thread a joke lmaoing so hard at your life right noe

>>17295 KaiOS is a piece of soykaf, and the Androids that most dumbphones run are closed forks.

>>17136 Pinephone runs on FLOSS, has hardware kill switches for camera, mics, and radios, works with LUKS based FDE (with postmarket OS), compatible with secure VOIP/IM protocols because gnu/linux.

>>17136 Yes somehow. Its small footprint means any backdoor on userspace can be easily detected when the performance is lagging down. I guess the insecure part is the fact that the baseband has its own audio stack meaning it doesn't even rely on software audio capabilities of your OS even if you delete those codecs, it's built into the chip. How else did really really dumbphones get audio support? The thing is we're moving on to LTE and even 5G everything below is obsoleted and it's not a bad thing for obvious reasons that this prevents criminals from being undetected and there is now less radio pollution when they start taking down those outdated towers. I think LTE is also better than previous techs, and even gsm isn't encrypted if you manage to open up a gsm dial up internet at this day and age. There's few LTE phones made before 2012 so you might want that instead of the current new ones which probably has 6 backdoors from multiple countries because multiple spies worked on that company and that phone to intentionally insert bugs.

>>17420 Can't they just make something like this? >floss pocket wifi or actually there's no wifi, just a ethernet port >which you can turn off >your phone is just a linux tablet with no radios and an ethernet port >you can access messaging over the gateway address >you get sms or call notifications over phone

>>17136 i hope you realize modern "dumb"phones in reality are weak smartphones with the same soykaf as an ordinary smartphone nearly all of them run kaios(propreitary fork of firefox os made for dumbphones), have 4g GSM connectivity and some even have fuarrrking facebook preinstalled a smartphone with a removable battery is as private as a modern, kaios running dumbphone. like genuinely, a pinephone is probably the best thing you can get to be honest >>17295 kai os is propreitary with certain open source elements mostly in the linux kernel, but in general its locked down chinese soykaf

>>17136 >Are dumbphones the most secure form of mobile device of communication one can have? If not why is so? No. Dumbphone GSM? It's as good as plaintext. Catchers can see transparent and even MitM without letting you know (all boils down to latency issues if that's the case). Internet? Depends, they can downgrade your LTE connection to GSM and there's no way you can force your modem to lock over that maybe there is but even an LTE connection can be from a rogue one (all boils down to latency issues if that's the case). The most secure maybe is hamradio encrypted but having a license or being unlicensed operator will still make glows surround you and do background checks. The second best might be USB modem with voip support, you can use it for texts or voip (never used voip though) and you don't have to worry about microphones, it's a USB modem, what can it do? Does it even have a powerful CPU? Unplug, remove battery if it has like pic rel, done. Plug it in some SBC with open source software and battery for certain situations. Chances are it won't matter at all since you need to hand over that passport to get a SIM. Dumbphone (new)? Come on, that is like using a proprietary wifi router from questionable source, you clearly don't know what other soykaf it does and it has its own processor and full stack OS. Smartphone (android)? >receive random phone call >pwned Easy. That means you've been pwned.

>>17136 >are dumphones better than smartphones for privacy NO! Every time I hear someone like you ask this exact question, I want to I am angry pretty hard. Feels like I've been asked and answered this a million times. Before I verbally assault you, I want to concede that I agree with two of your points: >The dumbphone does indeed make corporate bulk data collection harder. This is because Android or iOS phone all of your activity to Google or Apple, respectively. The spyware mentioned here is in the firmware of smartphones, and it is very hard to remove. >Since dumbphones do not have the aforementioned type of spying functionality in the firmware due to the lack of WiFi and Bluetooth radios, the amount of data Google and Apple knows about you is diminished greatly Personally, I think the problem with the dumbphone is that it doesn't make its user smart. You'd think "smart phone dumb human so dumb phone smart human" but you'd be wrong. You're just trying to take the simpler, contrarian option without understanding the technical aspect of it. Except no one thinks you're cool for having a dumbphone, it is quite literally the same thing as being really (tecnologically) dumb or extremely poor. There are Androids with removable batteries. They won't stop making them because there's a demand for them like there's demand for the audio jack. Overall, if you're truly concerned with privacy but you don't want to compromise on usability, your only real option is a rooted Android. I mean, put security and all that aside, you do realize they are discontinuing support for older dumbphones which are not compatible with modern infrastructure? And if you think older infrastructure was more secure than modern infrastructure, I laugh in your face. They're both swiss cheese, though. ON PURPOSE! >But lainon, why are dumphones worse for privacy/security than a rooted Android? Because while a dumphone is turned on, it's talking to the signal system. A hacker or glowie can still intercept everything you're doing with a dumphone like location, SMS, call, etc. With a dumbphone, a hacker/fed will actually have a much easier time doing this, although they have no trouble doing it to smartphones either. The difference with rooted Android is that phreaking (IE ping falsification) as well as radio silent mode is possible, and you can tell your device the physical location of cell towers so you're immune to stingray-like attacks. Yes, I concede that phreaking could also be done with dumbphones at some point, and may still. Questions?

>>17675 You forgot to mention that there are a bunch of intricate viruses that can hack your Android/Apple. >fake-shutdown mode while it reads and transmits sensor data >any app on the Android/Apple can also be hacked, allowing the smartphone to be hacked like a computer, which isn't something you worry about with a dumphone

>>17676 Yeah, the issue is that it has to be very targeted attack on you personally and you are somehow discarding the option that people can also target target your dumbphone with KaiOS or stripped down Android... The effort to target you specifically like this is far greater than man-in-the-middling your dumbphone GSM usage, or in case of the government, just asking your carrier. In other words, "just like hack the Android through 3rd party app we are not even maintaining" is just your fever dream and not something that could ever happen.

>>17142 You think your removable battery will save it from wireless glowie godmode?

>>17136 I'm still using my old samsung dumb phone. Not for security and privacy. I only use this old man 'cuz of long battery life, light weight, small size. Your mobile service providers still can track you even though you are using dumbphone. Because it will always be connected with mobile network except you turn off phone or don't carrying phone. Maybe there're advantages from old techs which normal people don't want to use anymore means it became more forgotten and forgotten; less percent to be an target by attackers. Also there're less telemetry things + you can't even install. Thus it doesn't perfect free from telemetry, but less then smartphones. However, Calls and SMS/MMS are kinda unsecured. I've heard that Volte is encrypted, but most old dumbphones were develpoed in 3g generation. So it's on the unsecure surface. I restricted phone usage. Only use it make meet my friends irl or send short calls. I don't send sensitive period things via my dumbphone. Nowadays dumbphones are quite soykafty too. Old ones are better. Most nokia's dumbphones' are on KaiOS which is dependent on Google. Maybe it can be solved with flashing custom rom; Gerda. Chinese dumbphones are soykaf. Koreans' LG Folder series were solid, but LG's mobile is gone and LG Folder series is similar to dumbphones, but it's based on android. Just customed be restricted. Plus, It can't meet Google's requirement to use google services.

>>18028 >However, Calls and SMS/MMS are kinda unsecured This is the sort of gear glowies have to pwn your calls, SMS, and even data: https://www.thespyphone.com/

>>17676 For those looking for proofs of remote malware installs and fake power off function listening bug, here are some sources I have organized: [2006] https://www.cnet.com/tech/services-and-software/fbi-taps-cell-phone-mic-as-eavesdropping-tool/ - Nextel and Samsung handsets and the Motorola Razr are especially vulnerable to software downloads that activate their microphones - The spyware could then place a call to the FBI and activate the microphone--all without the owner knowing it happened. - The U.S. Commerce Department's security office warns that "a cellular telephone can be turned into a microphone and transmitter for the purpose of listening to conversations in the vicinity of the phone https://web.archive.org/web/20080423092442/http://www.wasc.noaa.gov/wrso/security_guide/cellular.htm#Cellular%20Phones Cites "Just How Secure Is Your Cellular Phone?" article in National Reconnaissance Organization newsletter,1997: - A cellular telephone can be turned into a microphone and transmitter for the purpose of listening to conversations in the vicinity of the phone. This is done by transmitting to the cell phone a maintenance command on the control channel. This command places the cellular telephone in the "diagnostic mode." When this is done, conversations in the immediate area of the telephone can be monitored over the voice channel. - An article in the Financial Times last (2005) year said mobile providers can "remotely install a piece of software on to any handset, without the owner's knowledge, which will activate the microphone even when its owner is not making a call." https://web.archive.org/web/20061210024416/http://www.ft.com:80/cms/s/4239e29e-02f2-11da-84e5-00000e2511c8.html - but more significantly they can also remotely install a piece of software on to any handset, without the owner's knowledge, which will activate the microphone even when its owner is not making a call, giving security services the perfect bugging device. These are probably similar sources Richard Stallman attributes to 2006 book "Murder in Samarkand", by Craig Murray. https://stallman.org/rms-lifestyle.html [2017] Vault 7 CIA leak contains notes on Weeping Angel, a Samsung F Series (2013 Model) SmartTV malware implant claimed to be developed in 2014 https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_12353643.html - Added feature to periodically re-acquire alsa (audio) device while in Fake-Off mode. - Suppress LEDs to improve look of Fake-Off mode.

literally any government goon can listen your calls and read your messages with dumbphones tho

I have been wondering a while has anyone just made an app that can add end to end encryption on VoLTE calls to other's using the app instead of relying on standalone VoIP programs to make E2EE calls? Yes there isn't a huge difference Because VoIP apps on phones use LTE just the same but it would be more convenient if it was packaged slightly differently so it can be more easily used as your phone's default dialing app instead of as a supplementary app you have to use along side it. Something that will tell you when you get a call that the caller is using the app and the call is encrypted E2E not merely end to access as the usual VoLTE connection and ideally also tell you that the phone number isn't being spoofed so you know you're talking to the number it says you are. Also would it be possible to encrypt without someone else using such an app or is that possible because there needs to be a way to share keys both ways?

>>18036 VoLTE is like one of those bogus encryption schemes where intermediary (operator/carrier-controlled equipment) decides all primes and derived secrets for you, right? Fine, let's do PGP-over-Facebook. Assuming your local base station supports it, receiving end base station also does, both end devices support it, and you have means to inject arbitrarily encrypted data inside data stream (is this actually possible or as usual whole action is handled by locked-down baseband which has direct microphone access bypassing OS?). Then how does such system fall back? It does not in your situation because only fall backs are unencrypted protocols. In reality, VoLTE is one of those vaporwares 3GPP paper pushers try to develop in face of superior network-independent pure Internet protocol based services. Remember japanese email text messages and i-mode, remember 3G era video calls, remember enhanced SMS? Nah, people just use WhatsApp or whatever messaging app is popular in the region even at the cost of latencies acquired in traffic leaving the country. It's better metadata cover from local law enforcement than geolocated point-to-point cell phone calls lol. Cell operators are treated as ISPs data pipe. Internet in, Internet out, don't care about your backdoored non-protocols.

>>18039 That was a pretty drawn out way to say you think VoIP is better because the servers can be hosted in other countries. But this assumes those servers can be trusted so you're just adding another point of potential interception and potential data stream recording between you and who you communicate with. Only option to cut out the GSM, LTE or dedicated internet providers is using LoRa communicators but those would be more limited in use. Then what about cutting out the LTE all together and somehow encrypting the GSM call? Though I assume the encryption level possible would be pretty limited there but the thought is while sure it could be tapped and recorded to be later decrypted it unlikely is being recorded and stored by the mobile network provider themselves.

>>18035 that is also true of non-custom Android phones

>>18048 Oh, and IPhones too, obviously >>18039 I am no expert but VoLTE is probably easier for glowies to pwn than securely configured VoiP, but hey what do I know? I'm a skiddie

>>18049 In itself if the VoIP is end to end encrypted yes because VoLTE is only end to access encrypted not end to end encrypted and there is a relatively recently revieled security flaw with VoLTE where if it's improperly set up you can intercept someone's call unencrypted if you are connected to the same tower that is improperly set up by the network carrier but this is about a scenario of if an end to end encryption is added to the call from apps same as a P2P VoIP would do just it would take a different path I think because it would after getting to the tower go through a landline instead of an internet cable (I may be a bit off there idk) and it's use is meant to be more convenient as described here >>18036

>>17136 Yes, while a dumbphone has 'reduced attack surface' due to having less features such as NFC, BlueTooth, etc, many standard-phone such as the phone in OP's image, are running Android now, meaning the flip phones of today running Android, have the same exploitability as a standard smartphone. Of course, you could buy a 10 year old Nokia brick phone, but it won't have modern security updates. I personally will just be using a Android Phone with a custom-ROM such as Calyx OS and a Minimal Attack Surface, by only having LTE radio on, WIFI and BLuetooth, NFC, etc off.

When it comes to 'targeted exploits' the best defense is to avoid being recognized as a person to spy on in the first place. If the GOV doesn't know your secretly a Political Activist, Investigative Journalist etc, then they won't target you for it. Once your identified as a person of interest, they save that data forever and can hack you at any time. Being undetected in the first place, to avoid targeted exploits, is the best defense.

>>18053 >can hack you at any time Assume that the US government as well as other powerful world governments keep a list of problematic citizens on whom they focus their dragnet surveillance. Edward Snowden's discoveries imply this. Fun fact, in the US this technically means you're not a citizen if you get spied on like this, because the Bill of Rights clearly does not apply to you. Saying they can hack you at any time is also kind of giving them too much credit >they know your name and all your info so they can hack you at any time This is true of the 99.99%. It's true because (branches/tendrils of) the US government can take over the internet and RAT nearly any device easily. They know who has what device and can access essentially any database they wish, with or without accountability for it. >they know who has what device Carefully selecting your hardware defeats this, and the above thing. Even the government does not necessarily know that you're using a specific laptop or cell phone or whatever. >who can actually do this? Only elite US glowies at first because these backdoors were never meant to see the light of public opinion. Now, who knows? Probably all sorts of people. It isn't particularly hard to hack one specific device.

But how about Nokia's dumbphones based on KaiOS? I know it's sponsored by Google. But I think it's one of the usable dumbphones nowdays. I can get one with $9, but I'm concern should I buy one for alternate my dumbphone even though I have an smartphone not using currently.

My samshit dumbphone still works well. It doesn't have wifi, bluetooth modules. even games too. I love this but I don't know how long this phone can survive more.

>>17136 Dumb phones are cheaper than smart phones and have less attack surface. That said, they are still much less secure. The real solution lies in HOW you use them: reduce the problem and keep it simple, stupid. 1. Reduce the problem: only use your dumb phone to send text messages. 2. Protect your messages' confidentiality/integrity. Use a secondary OFFLINE device to compute these. If that isn't an option, a one-time pad or rolling code is the way to go: just be aware that shorter messages will be easier for network attackers to crack/spoof. 3. Rotate numbers/phones regularly, or at both low and random intervals.

They have fewer vectors of attack, but it doesn't really matter because the things they do have are easy to exploit and provide lots of useful information. Once you cross a certain threshold, it doesn't really matter exactly how insecure you are, just that it's enough to be a problem. Your best bet is a free hardware smartphone running entirely free software.

>>18139 >have less attack surface This is false. They all run decades-old mystery meat proprietary RTOS with very high probability of vendor-installed malware. The chinaman has tools and knows how to exploit it, you, or any western security researcher does not, and has to reverse engineer bypasses for single pre-installed game. Source: https://therecord.media/malware-found-preinstalled-in-classic-push-button-phones-sold-in-russia/ These devices are still manufactured and sold for a single purpose of clearing old stock of components. >protect your messages' confidentiality/integrity. A) Let me send this supir sikrit encrypted SMS to another number in same home register. Totally not suspicious and automatically flagged for closer surveillance. B) Send an encrypted message over Whatsapp like 2+ billion other humans do and nobody bats an eye. Do you not understand that a sealed envelope in a sea of postcards looks very suspicious, and besides, there are no ways to protect metadata (who sends messages to whom) unlike on any Internet overlay messaging system which can be wrapped behind 7 tunnels to different countries. >Use a secondary OFFLINE device to compute these I wonder what "dumb phone" lets you pre-load it with messages. My guess are none of them, unless we talk about cellular USB modems which let you send SMS from host PC after tweaking firmware. >Rotate numbers/phones regularly Irrelevant unless every new phone for you means change of activities area. You live in one place and go to work/school in one place for long periods of time. Correlating all new tracking devices you carry on self is very easy. I should stop replying in these LARP threads...

I will never understand thiz fetishism around so-called "dumb" phones...

>>18154 With a dumbphone you'll get an entirely different usage pattern. What you list is not a problem if you stop generating that metadata because your phone can barely do a single useful thing. Of course you could do the same with a smartphone, but I know no one who rejects the convenience. Besides, new dumbphones aren't the same thing as old dumbphones. Those 2010 devices that haven't seen a single update aren't going to do anything.

>>18154 >>18139 asserts that smart phones are more secure. No argument there. That said, >>dumb phones have less attack surface >This is false. LoC is one reasonable indicator of attack surface. By that metric, smart phones should have more holes. Further, smart phones have a much larger hardware footprint than dumb phones. However, dumb phones are neither updated nor easily auditable, so there remains a trade-off. If you can think of one, please mention a better metric. >Source: https://therecord.media/malware-found-preinstalled-in-classic-push-button-phones-sold-in-russia/ >These devices are still manufactured and sold for a single purpose of clearing old stock of components. Good to know. I wasn't aware of either. But smartphones are just as opaque in this regard, so this isn't a compelling reason against using a dumb phone. >Totally not suspicious and automatically flagged for closer surveillance. Everything should be authenticated/encrypted. It's just good practice. You could also apply steganography, but depending on the threat actor, it might not fly under the radar. In the case of image LSB stego, an actor with both supply chain and sufficient SS7 access could still flag you: http://www.ws.binghamton.edu/fridrich/Research/EI5685-29_Forensic.pdf >>Use a secondary OFFLINE device to compute these >I wonder what "dumb phone" lets you pre-load it with messages. It wasn't specified whether copying between the two would be automated. This is a security solution rather than a convenience one: specifically, you could still use a potentially-malware-ridden dumb phone for sending SMS, just not for authentication/encryption. Then the infected unit would go in the next hardware replacement cycle. >>Rotate numbers/phones regularly >Irrelevant unless every new phone for you means change of activities area. You live in one place and go to work/school in one place for long periods of time. Correlating all new tracking devices you carry on self is very easy. You don't soykaf where you eat, or at least I hope you don't. >unlike on any Internet overlay messaging system which can be wrapped behind 7 tunnels to different countries. Glad you mentioned it. That was the one thing I didn't touch on, because it's a bit implementation-specific. Here's one idea: combine SMS gateways with automatic email forwarding and an overlay network. So: SMS<->email<->{I2P,Tor}<->email<->SMS. Then send your authenticated+encrypted(+stego'd) SMS through that. Thanks, and please don't stop replying. This is an interesting exercise.

modern dumbphones have the advantage that >they are usually battery-removable >easily disposable (lower monetary cost) >can endure tougher treatment but given they run kaios for the mainstream brands, they are not much different from smartphones turned on. in general cellular communication should be done with the assumption of a lack of security or privacy, so far i've heard paging is a better option for security / privacy? but there are probably exploits there too.

>>18448 >they are usually battery-removable Most smartphones before 2017 are, most budget smartphones still are. >easily disposable (lower monetary cost) They hardly cost less than cheapest smartphones, especially used/thrifted, and since on these models all serial numbers can be rewritten in software, identity disposal cost becomes infinitely low >can endure tougher treatment You pulled this out of your ass.

>>18531 you're right about all of that except the other Anon was kinda right about the tougher treatment thing. I think they were referring to physically roughing up dumbphones, which is true, they're usually built less fragile.

>>18532 Taking off average feature phone as what is in OP's picture, they are not built from tougher plastic than cheap smartphones, we're not comparing rugged CAT-branded phones to latest porcelain slabs from Samsung. Of course, larger surface area means more leverage to bend and large glass surface is susceptible to shattering, but if a smartphone fits snug in the hand and in trouser's pocket (and cheapest ones do, they are not wide long phablets), two devices compared have equal lifespans when handled by able-bodied person.

>>18154 Only elite glowies (Chinese or US or Russian) have device-vuln databases like that. There are public ones too though. They get patched.

>>17138 >>18050 I run Asterisk at home, accessible through Wireguard. It's mostly for unlimited free calls from anywhere through my ISPs SIP account, but I got some family and friends to use it for calling each other, too. They like the audio quality and gimmicks like multiparty calls and goofy stuff like pitch shifting. Most of the time my phone is in airplane mode but with WiFi enabled. I also turn off the SIM in settings, which should power it off completely. Power draw goes down noticeably, at least. I don't use gapps or anything from Play store at all. I even uninstalled stuff like the broadcast receiver and whatever it was that lets the carrier install soykaf on my phone. Tracking or spying on me is more difficult that is worth it, if not actually impossible for regular law enforcement.

>>17169 you gotta get it unlocked ahead of time. if you used a CC, it can be tracked back to you, even if you gave them the wrong name. Unless you used cash, used something to obfuscate your face, you are being tracked, 24/7 just a reminder. of course, I am not disagreeing that you should have done what you did. Just throwing it out there.

If you want a secure phone for secure communication don't get a dumb phone. The GSM network not only has a very weak encryption but its also heavily monitored by agencies. Get a google pixel with graphene or any other smartphone with good support for graphene or lineageOS. Use end to end encryption apps for communication like signal, matrix, etc...

>>18630 I hate Pixel, so much hate for AMD and Pluton but Google's Titan is fine and good for security apparently

Get a Pixel and load CalyxOS on it. It comes baked with Signal, Tor, two VPNs, and an app firewall.

I got a new pixel with graphene and i am struggling to not hate it. The OS is fine but the phone is too big, bad designed, no SD card, no headphone jack, no removable battery...

On stock ROMs you can also disable most spyware with adb. >adb pm list-installed >adb pm uninstall --user 0 $pkg You can even do it on-device. Just enable remote adb by running >adb tcpip 5555 and then on your phone in Termux >adb connect 127.0.0.1 5555 and you got a privileged adb shell locally on your device. There are apps on F-Droid that now let you disable all Google soykaf and whatever else you don't like. It's still on the ROM, but it won't ever run. You can even brick it and cause bootloops if you disable too much, but a reset will work, obviously. This also let's you set otherwise inaccessible permissions using Permission Manager X. Again, powerful enough to soft-brick your phone. Sadly it needs to be set up every boot, but otherwise quite convenient. >>18642 Just install your favorite ROM on a device you like. All the security features worth using can be had on any ROM and most don't even require root at all, so are available on stock ROM with locked bootloader and no root. It doesn't even do FDE, but uses this retarded file based encryption. That means you can't turn it off and be sure that anyone else has anything but a useless brick in their hands. Any exploit attacking the network stack or USB port will make any of that encryption useless. I just can't take it seriously.

>>18154 >supir sikrit encrypted SMS Signal devs realized this long ago when they developed TextSecure application, coincidentally it's more likely to be connected with release of Signal for iOS which doesn't allow third party applications to use SMS/MMS and general orientation on turdworldlers. https://signal.org/blog/goodbye-encrypted-sms/ >They leak all possible metadata 100% of the time to thousands of cellular carriers worldwide. It’s common to think of SMS/MMS as being “offline” or “peer to peer,” but the truth is that SMS/MMS messages are still processed by servers – the servers are just controlled by the telcos. We don’t want the state-run telcos in Saudi, Iran, Bahrain, Belarus, China, Egypt, Cuba, USA, etc… to have direct access to the metadata of TextSecure users in those countries or anywhere else. If I remember correctly Signal is still developed and hosted in USA, right? Alas, nothing beats XMPP behind 7 proxies, thanks Moxie for Axolotl I guess.