Tamper-proofing systems

What kind of solutions you guys are using for physical security of servers? - Obviously full disk encryption, but how the systems are protected? - Of course initially it's optimal if the server is never found. But if it's found, how it's protected so it can't be practically recovered. Some systems ahem, are currently protected by following measures: - Pressurized dual double layer container, with pressure sensor between the two internal layers. If pressure changes, it's tripped. A specific mean was used to initialize container pressure differences when those were sealed. (wired) - Local wired vibration / orientation sensors -> Can't be moved. - Dual band wireless sensor networks including, remote door, cage, and motion detectors in the closed area + hardwired trip switches and microwave motion sensor in final cabinet case, in case the wireless devices are jammed. - Local direct, wireless + remote wipe (over network) options. - Now if the system is tripped, encryption keys are erased in unrecoverable fashion as well all systems shutdown. This solution should make it pretty much guaranteed, that the keys are lost in situation when someone tries to access the server, without the system being set up for service mode before entering. Do you see any weak points? - Not going in to the software / network security, just physical security for now. Just asking - SWIM

>>12854 To indulge in the fantasy: What do you use for a microwave motion sensor? Is it like that Wifi router mod thing where you can see what's behind a wall? Also: >someone can just ram a U-Haul into your building, trigger the vibration sensor and erase all your stuff >someone can just show up with a gun and make you unlock things or cause all your stuff to be erased >cut the power to the whole building, then run in, break all the stuff, and dump RAM. Where's your UPS? System needs to know if it's triggered so it can shut down. >get a hyperbaric chamber, pressurize it to the pressure of the internal layer, then break the glass >tunnel under the floor, go through the ceiling or wall >somewhere between software and hardware security: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.04014.pdf >one of your many unique sensors or components gets intercepted when you order it or is just compromised at the factory

I have a small Raspberry Pi running inside a janitor's closet somewhere in Fort Meade. Nobody has found out yet because nobody has the clearance to access it.

>>12857 YCA2002 - With circuit when it triggers, it just cuts power to the system. In early tests I had serious problems with this one, because it was way too sensitive. It triggered through plaster wall / wooden doors. In final setup that isn't a problem due to proper steel enclosed casing. For some purposes there are also plenty of nice ultra sonicsensors out there, which are also perfect for small enclosure. Yet in this case, it's was important to get the passive heat transfer to work well enough due to completely closed system. >>12858 That's one solution. Just hide the system somewhere, with self-destruct tamper switches. I've scouted a few semi secure locations, where free WiFi is available as well as continuous power supply. Suitable trip switches and ram only encryption keys, it's good to go. If it's found, then it's just lost. Time to setup new one somewhere else.

This is so strange, paranoid stuff. They're going after the encryption keys if you do that. Don't do it.

Futile. They'll just hire ESP to do the job or use quantum break.

>>12914 No, honestly. I've been wondering how often they gain something from server raids. If things are done correctly, raid shouldn't provide anything else than big chunk of encrypted data. Of course it leads to temporary short term shutdown of the service, but from backups it should be totally possible to recover quickly.

>>12918 How can you get the server running without a good amount of data being unencrypted? Unless you self host but even then

>>12926 It's kind of self-hosted. It's location rack cabinet in caged area. The caged area is monitored by passive infrared to be sure, it's not too trigger happy and the cabinets itself are protected by microwave motion sensors. As well as, a few key encryption key components are in the pressurized sealed container, with pressure change detector making tampering harder. The key server uses early-ssh and full disk encryption, as well as the other systems. But many of the servers just retrieve the data from the key-server, so it's not absolutely vital to log in to all servers to get those going. If any sensor is tripped, whole cage is powered down. Unless set in maintenance mode before entering. With this kind of setup, it should be pretty hard to get anything useful by raiding the hosting site. Except hardware and encrypted data.

>>12933 >>12868 Are you batman?

>>12935 No, why do you ask? I'll take care of company servers + a few hobby projects with privacy loving closed it sector working group of users.

For protecting miniature servers, is there some sort of compound that is hard to cut, melts at temperatures high enough to melt all solder and damage memory chips from heat overexposure?

>>12942 Any links / references / product info?

>>12942 Not really, if you have to weld the alloy around the system you apply heat to it as well.

>>12949 Nah, too complicated and not efficient (?). Of course the whole system could be in eboxy or something like that. But I don't see it worth of doing it. Whole point is that the keys must be lost, before they even realize it. Protecting keys is very hard if the keys are still available and they've got full physical access. While designing the system, we did read quite a few documents about perimeter security as well as about tamper prooving / booby trapping explosives. Average raid team doesn't handle the situation in a way like bomb squad would. Unless they know what they're up to, the keys are waayyyyy gone, before they even know it. Current multi layer apporach should take care of it. The key server itself is of coruse small part of it. It's important that all the servers are affected, before gaining physical access.

>>12942 certain kinds of industrial epoxy maybe.

>>12973 >>12942 you could make a small two-part steel case (1/8 inch should be more than enough to make anything but an angle grinder insufficient) and buy some really sturdy epoxy to stick the parts together. Make the two parts overlap significantly so you get a big surface for the epoxy and they can't just cut the epixy seal, which will always be weaker

>>12854 >>Guri and his fellow Ben-Gurion researchers have shown, for instance, that it's possible to trick a fully offline computer into leaking data to another nearby device via the noise its internal fan generates, by changing air temperatures in patterns that the receiving computer can detect with thermal sensors, or even by blinking out a stream of information from a computer hard drive LED to the camera on a quadcopter drone hovering outside a nearby window. In new research published today, the Ben-Gurion team has even shown that they can pull data off a computer protected by not only an air gap, but also a Faraday cage designed to block all radio signals. https://cyber.bgu.ac.il/advanced-cyber/airgap https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YKRtFgunyj4 POWER-SUPPLaY: Leaking Data from Air-Gapped Systems by Turning the Power-Supplies Into Speakers AiR-ViBeR: Exfiltrating Data from Air-Gapped Computers via Covert Surface ViBrAtIoNs BRIGHTNESS: Leaking Sensitive Data from Air-Gapped Workstations via Screen Brightness BeatCoin: Leaking Private Keys from Air-Gapped Cryptocurrency Wallets, Mordechai Guri PowerHammer (exfiltrating data through power lines) MOSQUITO (Acoustic) "MOSQUITO: Covert Ultrasonic Transmissions between Two Air-Gapped Computers using Speaker-to-Speaker Communication " ODINI (Magnetic) "ODINI : Escaping Sensitive Data from Faraday-Caged, Air-Gapped Computers via MAGNETO (Magnetic) "MAGNETO: Covert Channel between Air-Gapped Systems and Nearby Smartphones via CPU-Generated Magnetic Fields" AirHopper (Electromagnetic) Mordechai Guri, Gabi Kedma, Assaf Kachlon, and Yuval Elovici. "AirHopper: Bridging the air-gap between isolated networks and mobile phones using radio frequencies." Guri, Mordechai, Matan Monitz, and Yuval Elovici. "Bridging the Air Gap between Isolated Networks and Mobile Phones in a Practical Cyber-Attack." BitWhisper (Thermal) Mordechai Guri, Matan Monitz, Yisroel Mirski, and Yuval Elovici. "Bitwhisper: Covert signaling channel between air-gapped computers using thermal manipulations." In Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), 2015 IEEE 28th, pp. 276-289. IEEE, 2015. GSMem (Electromagnetic) Mordechai Guri, Assaf Kachlon, Ofer Hasson, Gabi Kedma, Yisroel Mirsky, and Yuval Elovici. "GSMem: Data exfiltration from air-gapped computers over gsm frequencies." In 24th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 15), pp. 849-864. 2015. DiskFiltration (Acoustic) "Acoustic Data Exfiltration from Speakerless Air-Gapped Computers via Covert Hard-Drive Noise (‘DiskFiltration’)". USBee (Electromagnetic) "USBee: Air-Gap Covert-Channel via Electromagnetic Emission from USB." LED-it-GO (Optical) "LED-it-GO: Leaking (A Lot of) Data from Air-Gapped Computers via the (Small) Hard Drive LED". Fansmitter (Acoustic) "Fansmitter: Acoustic data exfiltration from air-Gapped computers via fans noise." aIR-Jumper (Optical, Infrared) "aIR-Jumper: Covert air-gap exfiltration/infiltration via security cameras & infrared (IR) " CTRL-ALT-LED (Optical) xLED (Optical) VisiSploit (Optical) LCD TEMPEST Air-Gap Attack Reloaded (Electromagnetic) Optical air-gap exfiltration attack via invisible images (Optical) Optical Covert Channel from Air-Gapped Networks via Remote Orchestration of Router/Switch LEDs (Optical) Read about cold boot attacks. Are you aiming for confidentiality or availability?