Experience as fundamental axiom of metaphysics

When developing a metaphysical framework, it seems that the natural assumption made by humans is to state that the physical world exists independent of one's existence, and that we ourselves have come to exist after an infinity of death, and will soon return to it. What if instead the founding axiom was the presence of experiencing the present. That the experience will remain forever in whatever form it may take, and that the physical world is an extension and a subordinate of experience. Upon what we conceive of as death, it is not experience that disappears but rather the physical world that does, to be replaced with wherever next the present is to take us. That the kernel of oneself is the experience itself, rather than a physical extension of it like one's body or personality. Let's go further and discard the traditional duality of body and mind. What if the physical world's existence is bound to the experience itself. Upon cessation of its experience the material world itself would end? What if the physical world as we know it is an extension of experience, rather than a standalone entity separate from it? Such a theory would coincide with what has recently been discovered in quantum physics would it not? The only difficulty with such a theory would be how we appoach the existence of multiple experiences that seem to share a singular physical world. But is there more than one singular experience? Are others not simply machines, akin to the one the experience seems to be attached to now? --- --- --- Anyhow, I'd love to hear what you all think of the concepts above. As crazy as it sounds, I prefer this model of the world to what we conventionally have in our culture today. I also find it very interesting that philosophers like Schoppenhauer and Nietzche, Buddhists and Psychedelic users all seem to come to this same conclusion. If anyone would like to read up on the topic from someone far more intelligent than me, I recommend you research/read/watch: -Schoppenhauer's Essays and Aphomisms (Althought if someone could recommend one of his major works, that'd be great) -Nietzche's Beyond Good and Evil -Original buddhist doctrine: https://odysee.com/@TheoriaApophasisArchive:7?view=content

>>62765 I could have proofread better, but instead I'll say the most egregious of errors is to say is point two should read Any theory that has a beginning or end is invalid due to infinite regress. I.e. if God made us what made God? I'm not correcting the other mistakes because I accept I'm a dum dum. :)

>it seems that the natural assumption made by humans is to state that the physical world exists independent of one's existence I have never seen and continue to see absolutely zero proof of this. It's like those idiot physicalists who think there is a 'hard problem of consciousness' AKA the 'mind-body problem' - no, because while I can prove the existence of the subjective experience, I cannot prove the existence of a physical body of brain at all, so that question is irrelevant. . .

>>64957 >Any notion of proof or argument presupposes subjective experience in the first place, so that's an absurd question. I disagree. A proof does not need to be observed to still be a proof. It has intrinsic qualities like everything else.

>>64958 Every proof is a proof about something that I have some kind of experience of. If I intend to give a proof that the earth revolves around the sun, I need internal experience of what "sun", "earth", and "revolve" are, otherwise the proof has no content and refers to nothing. Doesn't even matter whether the experience is direct or indirect, or whether we think that experiences come to us from external objects themselves, from ideas that refer to external objects, or from ideas unconnected to any external reality, all of those are fine. But you can't have a proposition without concepts that the proposition refers to.

>>64959 >otherwise the proof has no content and refers to nothing So if I am a philosophical zombie with no experiences, then my arguments don't count, even if they have all of the objective qualities of a sound argument, and even if there is no way for you to distinguish between my arguments and those of a conscious mind? If so, how can a thinking mind/machine determine whether it is truly having experiences, or has only been thinking and expressing an empty concept of experience? Or does the ability to build an argument imply consciousness by itself? Here is a proof that the earth revolves around the sun constructed by a machine learning language model: > The sun is the center of the solar system. > The earth is a planet in the solar system. > All planets in the solar system revolve around the sun. > Therefore, the earth revolves around the sun. >This proof is based on the scientific fact that the sun is the center of the solar system and that all of the planets, including the earth, orbit around the sun. The first three statements in the proof are premises, and the final statement is the conclusion that follows logically from the premises. The model isn't perfect, it took several attempts before it would output something that wasn't obviously wrong. But it is widely accepted that it possesses some functional abstractions of concepts, and is able to apply some rudimentary logical processing to them. This shouldn't be too controversial; algorithms have been around a long time, we know that reality at the very least does not preclude the processing of information as a mechanical procedure. Does its ability to consider the motions of the sun and earth prove that ChatGPT has experiences? I don't really think so. It still wouldn't be proof even if it was trained to start thinking and talking in a way consistent with having experiences. But maybe humans are also like that, and it seems impossible to tell the difference in any objective way.

>>65801 >Why can't I say the intuitive impression of being conscious of things is false Because your ability to have intuitions, impressions, and reflecting on and having opinions about them are all part of what is called "consciousness". We're going in circles, I'm really not sure what you think consciousness is.

>>65802 I think >>65801 is talking about a lack of things to be conscious of, not a lack of consciousness itself.

>>65846 Oh, well sure then, the hypothetical world I am describing depends on there being a world. I wouldn't call it a certainty, because it could be imagined that nothing occurs, but within the context of any non-null model of things, yeah it's a dependency. Did you have something in mind for what this might imply?

>>62748 A problem is that without a theory, there can't be any experiences. Every observation is theory-laden. Think of how you can see one clear object instead of a vague image while you have two eyes. That's because your mind already has a theory of visions since your birth. Because of this, I can't accept that experiences are fundamental.

Read William James and Kierkegaard if you want to get a taste of metaphysical systems based on experience. James does it by disregarding the object/subject dichotomy and taking the experience as the foundation and Kierkegaard says Truth is subjective. (Kierkegaard only insofar as James seems to take some ideas from him, also you will probably like Kierkegaard if you like Nietzsche.) Also by just reading what has already been written you can probably see most of your ideas already thought of and even expanded upon.